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Resumo 
 
As estratégias de gestão dos Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual (DPI) têm ganho uma 
importância crescente, especialmente no contexto académico, uma vez que as invenções 
geradas neste contexto estão muitas vezes na fronteira de grandes avanços científicos e 
os retornos da inovação necessitam de ser adequadamente apropriados.  
Várias políticas públicas têm sido implementadas para encorajar e suportar 
financeiramente a criação de parques de ciência e tecnologia e incubadoras, na crença 
de que estas estruturas promoveriam o uso de mecanismos de proteção dos DPI pelas 
Academic Spin-offs (ASOs), afetando, em última instância, a competitividade destas 
empresas. Contudo, existem muito poucos estudos quantitativos que provem/avaliem o 
impacto dos mecanismos de proteção dos DPI na competitividade das empresas.   
O presente estudo visa preencher esta lacuna. Através de um inquérito direto dirigido a 
startups localizadas em parques de ciência e tecnologia e incubadoras, avaliamos o 
impacto direito e indireto (através do tamanho e intensidade de investigação e 
desenvolvimento) dos mecanismos de proteção dos DPI, globalmente e por tipos, na 
competitividade destas empresas.  
Os resultados baseados numa amostra de 48 empresas sugerem que, de uma forma 
global, a proteção formal dos DPI é prejudicial à competitividade das empresas. Não 
obstante, quando os mecanismos de proteção dos DPI são discriminados por tipo, os 
resultados apontam que o uso de mecanismos de proteção informais, nomeadamente o 
tempo de aprovisionamento ou ciclo e os segredos comerciais, promovem a 
competitividade das empresas, ao passo que o uso de mecanismos formais de proteção, 
em particular as patentes, as marcas registadas e as denominações de origem, têm um 
impacto negativo nessa mesma competitividade. A dimensão e perfil de inovação da 
empresa intermedeiam a influência da protecção dos DPI na competitividade dessa 
mesma empresa. 
 
Palavras-chave: Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual (DPI); Academic Spin-offs (ASOs); 
Parques de ciência e tecnologias e incubadoras; Startups; Competitividade 
  
 iv 
Abstract  
 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) management strategies have obtained increasing 
attention, particularly in the academic context, because inventions generated in this 
context are often at the frontier of scientific breakthroughs and innovation returns need 
to be adequately appropriated.  
Several public policies have been in palce to encourage and financially support the 
creation of science and technology (S&T) parks and incubators on the belief that these 
structures would foster the use of IPRs protection mechanisms by Academic Spin-offs 
(ASOs), affecting ultimately these companies’ competitiveness. However, very few 
quantitative studies exist that prove/assess the impact of IPRs protection mechanisms on 
companies’ competitiveness.  
The present study aimed at fill this lacuna. Through a direct survey targeting startups 
located in S&T parks and incubators, we assessed the direct and indirect (through size 
and R&D intensity) impact of IPRs protection mechanisms, globally and by types, on 
the competitiveness of these companies.  
Results based on a sample of 48 companies suggest that, globally considered, formal 
IPRs protection is detrimental to companies’ competitiveness. Notwithstanding, when 
IPRs protection mechanisms are discriminated by type, results point that the use of 
informal protection mechanisms, such as lead time and trade secrets foster companies’ 
competitiveness, whereas the use of formal protection mechanisms, in particular, 
patents, trademarks and geographical indications, negatively impact that same 
competitiveness. Size and the innovation profile of the company intermediates the 
influence of IPRs protection on the competitiveness of that same company.  
 
Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Academic Spin-offs (ASOs); Science 
and Technology (S&T) parks and incubators; Startups; Competitiveness  
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1. Introduction 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are the rights given to persons over the creations of 
their minds and usually encompass two main dimensions (WTO, 2015): 1) copyright 
and rights related to copyrights, and 2) industrial property, which includes inventions 
(protected by patents), industrial designs and trade secrets. 
According Park, Lee and Jun (2015), most companies develop technologies in order to 
improve their competitiveness in the market and patent them around the world to protect 
their intellectual property. Competitive power of a company depends therefore on 
technologies developed by it (Banerjee, 2014).  
The management of Intellectual Property (IP), especially in form of patents, has 
obtained increasing importance to small and medium-sized technology companies 
which adopt many different strategies to explore and exploit knowledge since research 
and development (R&D) to technology commercialization (Kay, Youtie and Shapira, 
2014). Companies look for an effective IP management strategy which allows them to 
maximize returns to their investments in R&D of new technologies and innovative 
products, processes and services and to protect and possibly improve their 
competitiveness (Kay et al., 2014). In this sense, Bos, Broekhuizen and Faria (2015) 
suggest that companies can achieve competitive advantages only by effectively 
appropriating value from protection of knowledge of their innovation activities from 
uses of competitors. 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) management strategies are particularly important in 
the academic context because inventions generated in this context, although typically 
undeveloped, they are often at the frontier of scientific breakthroughs (Jensen and 
Thursby, 2001; Colyvas et al., 2002), with many and varied risks associated with 
validation, industrialization and commercialization of these inventions (Munari, 
Pasquini and Toschi, 2015). Sophisticated investors such as ventures capitalists (VCs) 
may be reluctant to invest in these ventures due to high transaction costs, information 
asymmetries (at least in early stages) about firm’s market value and its potential growth 
and high risks related to the uncertainty of commercial potential (Murray, 2007; 
Gubitta, Tognazzo and Destro, 2015). This situation sometimes leads to a funding gap 
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to support technology transfer activities and Academic Spin Offs (ASOs)1 (Munari and 
Toschi, 2014). However, high competition and rapid development of technologies have 
attracted a growing interest by governments in fostering the establishment of 
increasingly close relations between universities and industry to facilitate effective 
research and technology transfer (Teixeira and Mota, 2012; Wilson, 2012). More and 
more universities are successfully involved in creation and development of new high-
growth technology businesses (Rasmussen and Wright, 2015). Therefore, governments 
and regional authorities from many countries have implemented public policies to 
encourage and financially support the creation of incubating infrastructures such as 
Incubators and Technology Accelerators (Rasmussen, Sørheim, 2012). 
Some studies have concluded that the relationship between universities and support 
infrastructures such as Science parks and Incubators is strongly associated with the 
commercial performance of ASOs (Minguillo and Thelwall, 2015; Teixeira and Castro, 
2015). However, so far there are few studies that have been working how ASOs grow 
and what kind of conditions and support structures facilitate their success (Rasmussen 
and Wright, 2015). Moreover, despite the (seeming) importance of Technology and 
Transfer Offices (TTOs), Science and Technology parks and Incubators in the process 
of defining the best IPRs management, the topic of IPRs management and the extent to 
which it contributes to ASOs’ performance/competiveness has received little attention 
in the literature.  
It is not yet clear how companies (including ASOs) choose intellectual property 
protection mechanisms in open innovation and how this choice affects their 
performance/competitiveness (Stefan and Bengtsson, 2014). Patents are the protection 
mechanism that attracts more attention in management research (McGahan and 
Silverman, 2006; Blind, Cremers and Mueller, 2009; Levitas and McFadyen, 2009). In 
contrast, mechanisms such as copyrights, lead time or secrecy have received much less 
attention from the literature (Bos et al., 2015). Additionally, some studies suggest that 
smaller companies, most notably technological startups (Block, De Vries, Schumann 
and Sandner, 2014), tend to choose informal protection mechanisms due the lack of 
resources (e.g., Olander, Vanhala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2014).  
                                               
1  Academic Spinoffs (ASOs) are new ventures generated within a university setting and based on 
technology derived from academic research (Rasmussen and Borch, 2010). 
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In this context, the present study aims primarily to assess the impact of IPRs protection 
mechanisms and types on the competitiveness of ASOs located in science and 
technology parks and incubators. Additionally, it intends to uncover the reasons 
weighting in the decision about formal or informal protection mechanisms, and how 
such choice affects firm performance/competitiveness. 
In terms of structure, this dissertation presents the first two sections with a literature 
review on the issue of IPRs protection and competiveness. Then, in Section 3 the 
methodological underpins are briefly described. The empirical results are detailed in 
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the study highlighting the main outcomes, 
limitations and further avenues for future research. 
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2. IPRs protection and competiveness: literature review 
2.1. Main concepts 
IPRs protection and competitiveness have been connected discursively since 1970s, 
although in a more prevalent way during the late 1970s and 1980s, when IPRs 
protection started to be framed as a competitiveness issue (Muzaka, 2013). The 
importance of IPRs was recognized at first with two treaties administered by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO): the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property in 1883 and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literacy and 
Artistic Works in 1886 (Cottier, 1991). 
Given the multitude of definitions that have been developed around these concepts, it is 
necessary first of all to operate a real ‘epistemological rupture’. In fact, one of the 
difficulties that have been recurrent in the research of IPRs and competitiveness is 
related with the definition and harmonization of these concepts (Martín-de Castro, 
2014).  
2.1.1. IPRs 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), intellectual 
property (IP) “refers to creations of the mind: inventions, literary and artistic works, 
designs and symbols, names and images used in commerce”.2 
In the literature we find essentially two types of IPRs definitions: those which are 
focused in its nature and those which are focused in its function.  
A definition of the first type is, for instance, the definition provided by World Trade 
Organization (WTO) that considers IPRs as rights of exclusive use granted to people for 
their mental creations for a certain period of time.3 The second type of definitions 
emphasizes the relationship between IPRs protection and competitiveness. 
Regarding the first type of definition, it is common to divide intellectual property into 
two branches: industrial property, which is obtained upon completion of filing and 
registration formalities, and copyright and rights related to copyright (sometimes 
                                               
2 In World Intellectual Property Organization. What is Intellectual Property? Retrieved November 1, 
2015, from http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/.  
3 In World Trade Organization. What are intellectual property rights? Retrieved November 1, 2015, from 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm. 
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referred to as “neighbouring”), usually obtained automatically, not depending on any 
formalities. 
Industrial property includes a variety of protective rights aimed at conferring an 
exclusive monopoly on the exploitation of an intellectual creation related to industry 
and commerce, but also to agricultural and extractive industries and all manufactured or 
natural products (Article 1 (3) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property).4 
From a utilitarian point of view we can say that industrial property protection takes 
place in two areas: one characterized by the protection of distinctive signs and another 
which includes patents for inventions, industrial designs and trade secrets. 
The protection of distinctive signs relates specifically to trademarks, which distinguish 
the products and services of a company from other companies, and geographical 
indications, which allow the identification of the geographical origin of a product by the 
presence of certain features. Therefore, this kind of protection stimulates and ensures 
fair competition between companies, on the one hand, and protects consumers, allowing 
them to make informed choices between the other products and services provided, on 
the other hand. 
The protection may last indefinitely, provided the sign in question continues to be 
distinctive. 
The patents, industrial designs and trade secrets aim primarily to stimulate innovation 
by protecting the results/returns of the investment in R&D of a new technology. 
Notwithstanding this main purpose, this kind of protection should also facilitate 
technology transfer through foreign direct investment, joint ventures and licensing. It is 
usually given for a finite term (typically 20 years in the case of patents). 
Copyright relates strongly to the economic exploitation of artistic and literary creations 
generally referred to as ‘works’, since that this kind of protection gives the holder the 
exclusivity of making copies. These ‘works’ covered by copyright include, but are not 
limited, to novels, films, music, paintings, photographs, architectural design, maps, 
sculpture, books and other writings, advertisement, software creations and databases.  
                                               
4 In World Intellectual Property Organization. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. 
Retrieved November 5, 2015, from http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=288514#P81_6245. 
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In turn, author’s rights, typical of the civil law countries, refers more strongly to the 
person behind the creation and accordingly go further, recognizing and protecting not 
only its right to economically benefit from the exploitation of the creation, but also to its 
moral rights to be recognized as the creator and to ensure the respect of the work´s 
identity. Author’s rights remain for a minimum period of 50 years after the death of the 
author. 
Finally, “related rights” or rights related to copyright are similar or identical to those of 
copyright, although sometimes more limited and of shorter duration. The beneficiaries 
of related rights are: performers (such as actors, singers and musicians), producers of 
phonograms (sound recordings) and broadcasting organizations in their radio and 
television programs.  
The main social purpose of protection of copyright and related rights is to encourage 
and reward creative work. 
Regarding the second type of definition - which emphasizes the relationship between 
IPRs protection and competitiveness - IPRs are tools of market regulation, which shape 
the competitive configuration, being able to change it completely (Ramello, 2005). In 
fact, IPRs, by definition, not only give to their holders a portion of market power, 
protecting them from competition, as well as give them sometimes monopoly power. In 
this sense, companies have used IPRs, not only as a tool to attract investment, but also 
as building block of their own business strategy to obtain competitive advantage and 
maximize revenues (Singh, 2015).  
IPRs allow companies to commercialize products and services or to license innovation 
which is detailed and codified through the legal system (European Commission, 2014), 
preventing that firm’s innovations are exposed without any kind of protection and 
explored by the competitors (Singh, 2015).    
2.1.2. Competitiveness 
Competitiveness is a multidimensional concept that can be looked at from different 
levels: country/region, industry and firm level (Fagerberg, 1996; Ajitabh and Momaya, 
2004; Cetindamar and Kilitcioglu, 2013; Papalia, Calia and Filippucci, 2015).  
Focusing on the firm level, firm competitiveness can be defined as the capability of the 
firm to meet the customer needs in a profitable and sustainable way (Chikán, 2008). The 
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great difficulty of the companies lies here in providing, in a profitable way, goods and 
services that have more value to the customers than those that are provided by 
competitors, at the same time they are continuously developing adaptation initiatives to 
fit fast-changing market conditions, as well as the economic norms. 
Another definition, provided by Cetindamar and Kilitcioglu (2013), realizes firm 
competitiveness as the capacity of the firm to compete with the others in a specific 
market, to increase its market share and to enter in international markets. These authors 
consider firm performance (output), firm resources (input) and the management 
processes these resources as key pillars of firm competitiveness, allowing companies to 
grow and be profitable in a sustainable way. Such capability cannot be considered 
sufficient condition to lead the firm to success. It only means that the firm has the 
ability to compete with the other companies, being the success merely an opportunity 
included in this capacity that may or may not be grasped through a proper management 
of the firm’s everyday operations. 
The definition developed by the Research Centre for Competitiveness (see Gál, 2010) 
seems, however, be the most comprehensive: firm competiveness encompasses “the 
company’s ability to permanently offer consumers products and services, which are in 
compliance with the standards of social responsibility, and for which they are willing to 
pay more than for the competitors’ products, ensuring proﬁtable conditions for the 
company. Condition of this competitiveness is that the company should be able to detect 
changes in the environment and within the company, by performing permanent better 
market competition criteria compared to the competitors” (Gál, 2010: 3).  
From this definition, it is possible to identify some basic competitiveness features, 
namely the ability to ensure the “efficiency” in the use of resources and the ability to 
achieve economic goals (“effectiveness”).  
Despite competitiveness being recognized as a multidimensional concept that is based 
on different aspects of the complex economic activity, there is a lack of studies that 
measure companies’ competiveness in its multiple dimensions (Papalia et al., 2015). 
The competiveness composite indicator at micro level, proposed by Papalia et al. 
(2015), based on Fischer and Schornberg’s findings (2007), provides a 
multidimensional economic performance index that can be used to measure 
competitiveness. According to these authors, the competitiveness of a company can be 
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measured in three dimensions: efficiency, effectiveness and growth indicator. Efficiency 
is related to the degree to which the outputs are generated from inputs and reflect how 
well resources are used. Effectiveness is related to the ability to achieve stated goals. 
Since the ultimate goal of a firm is to get income, effectiveness can be referred to the 
firm’s ability to compensate its employees and provide returns to its owners. Lastly, 
growth indicator is a dynamic component of competitiveness.  
2.2. IPRs protection as source of competitive advantage  
Nowadays, IPRs protection, more than being used by companies as a tool to attract 
investment (Glass and Saggi, 2002; Smarzynska, 2004) and create wealth (Braga and 
Fink, 2000; Schneider, 2005), has been recognized as a source of competitive advantage 
(Singh, 2015). 
On the one hand, IPRs protection prevent that firm’s innovations are exposed without 
any kind of protection and explored by the competitors, giving to the companies a 
portion of market power and sometimes monopoly power materialized in the exclusivity 
use and commercialization of their innovations that are legally protected from potential 
violations (Sey, Lowe and Poole, 2010). 
Depending on the type of IPRs protection used, it seems to help companies to create and 
sustain competitive advantage in several ways (Reitzig, 2004): it can provide a 
temporary technological lead (incumbency advantages), protect strong brands and help 
to establish a standard in the market and to protect key components increasing switching 
costs.  
The use of patents by companies is capable to provide a temporary technological lead 
but also shape industry structure (Reitzig, 2004). Patenting of incumbent products may 
discourage the establishment of new businesses, operating as a barrier in the market for 
the competitors, especially in sectors whose development and approval are more time-
consuming and costly (e.g., health care sectors) (Calabrese, Baum and Silverman, 
2000), at the same time that favors the development of economies of scale by the 
companies that owns the patent. In order to sustain competitive advantage, companies 
can opt to use a patent fence, which consist in protect not only the core invention of the 
product developed but also a set of substitutes, which can be easily constructed by the 
competitors (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000).   
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Trademarks and geographical indications allow companies to produce products and 
services with consistent quality which cannot be produced by competitors imitating 
their distinctive marks (Fisher, 2001). For this reason, they can protect strong brands, 
forming a promotional advantage (Reitzig, 2004). 
IPRs protection can also be used to increase switching costs, either establishing a 
standard in the market, since that technologies further developed are assigned to fit or 
be compatible with the standard, either protecting key components for the functioning 
of patented technology (Reitzig, 2004), which provides to the company holding the 
protection a certain market monopoly in the production and commercialization of these 
components. 
On the other hand, it fosters creativity and innovation of businesses, which are as well a 
measure of firm performance. It encourages companies to invest their resources in R&D 
of new and innovative products and services, due to the expectancy of appropriation the 
full returns thereof, if it is granted to the company an adequate and stricter protection 
regime of its innovations, with severe legal sanction for those who attempt copy or 
imitate them (Colson, 2001; Mani and Nelson, 2013); otherwise the prevalence and 
scope of innovation most likely decreases. In other words, it operates as a safeguard for 
creators, innovators or producers, since they feel comfortable to invest time, money and 
efforts on research and development of new technologies and products, knowing that 
they belong to them even that they will not be successful (Singh, 2015). 
In this sense, IPRs protection assumes particularly strategic importance for smalls 
companies because the success of these companies depends a lot on creativity and 
innovation of products and services provided (Singh, 2015). Some of them are 
dedicated to creating new products, services and processes, other are specialized in 
adapting existing technologies to specific market niches. Furthermore, IPRs protection 
also allows to these companies the development of innovative business models (Singh, 
2015). 
Competitiveness has been associated with IPRs protection of radical innovations that 
introduce technological breakthroughs and contribute to the vertical differentiation of 
products and services provided by several companies (Reitzig, 2004). Prior studies have 
shown that startups play a key role in the generation of radical innovations (Colombo, 
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Doganova, Piva, D’Adda and Mustar, 2015). Therefore, an adequate IPRs protection in 
this type of companies can impact their competitiveness.  
The use of patents and trademarks have been widely used throughout the industrial 
history to obtain competitive advantage (Singh, 2015), as well as business method 
patents (Vaver, 2006). Especially in small businesses, patents and trademarks, as well as 
industrial design and copyrights, seem to be very useful in textile, toy, publishing, 
biotechnology and retail industries sectors, among others (Chaudhuri, Goldberg and Jia, 
2003; WIPO, 2006). 
Taking the arguments above, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Companies that protect their assets are more competitive. 
2.3. IPRs as appropriation strategy and firm competitiveness  
The literature has suggested that IPRs protection responds often to the appropriability 
problem of knowledge (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007). Nevertheless, there are some 
factors that influence the choice by the companies of (formal or informal) protection 
mechanisms as appropriation strategy which allows them to protect an innovation from 
imitation and achieve innovation returns improving their competitiveness.   
According to Leiponen and Byma (2009), the appropriation strategies picked by the 
companies are qualitatively different whether they are small or large companies. 
In fact, the majority of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) prefer informal protection 
mechanisms instead of IPRs protection because they considered them more familiar, 
cheaper and less time-consuming. Moreover, they tend to be considered more effective 
in some cases5 greatly because the operating knowledge in this type of companies is 
predominantly tacit (Macdonald, 2003; Jensen, Morgan, Weatherall and Webster, 2005) 
and therefore it cannot be converted into coded information (Thomä and Bizer, 2013).  
Other reasons for SMEs to use less IPRs than large companies are the poor awareness 
about IPRs protection benefits to the business context, the perception of IPRs protection 
as an expensive and complicated process and the greater difficulty in obtaining and 
enforcing this kind of protection (Cohen, 1989; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; 
Macdonald, 2004). The literature has shown that SMEs have been less successful in the 
                                               
5 Only small companies that invest heavily in R&D and have partnerships with universities are more 
inclined to consider patents the most effective protection tool (Thomä and Bizer, 2013). 
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patent applications than large companies due the insufficient knowledge of the IP 
system, lack of information, poorly developed applications and low access to the legal 
counseling (Sey et al., 2010).  
However, owners of small companies do not consider the granting of IPRs protection an 
obstacle to the success of the appropriation of returns from their innovations because 
they only choose IPRs over informal protection mechanisms under specific conditions 
wherein acquisition and enforcement costs are insignificant compared to the potential 
benefits of its use (Thomä and Bizer, 2013). In other words, the decision of small 
companies to protect or not IPRs seems to be the result of weighting costs and benefits 
of the use of formal protection methods. 
Actually, several studies have relativized the importance of IPRs as a way of obtaining 
innovation returns highlighting lead time, secrecy and complementary assets as 
appropriation methods which in some cases are more effective than patents (Cohen et 
al., 2000; Laursen and Salter, 2005).  
Sey et al. (2010) confirmed that SMEs, in order to protect their innovations, have 
chosen to use informal methods such as trade secrets, product quality maintenance, 
customized services and continued innovation, more than formal IPRs protection 
methods, which have not been used as a competitive advantage. IPRs protection is only 
relevant for the SMEs competitiveness if it was considered an integrated approach that 
takes in account several factors such as the knowledge of the benefits of an adequate 
IPRs protection, the access to the proper IPRs protection services ensuring an effective 
IPRs enforcement, at the same time that are undertaken others competitive strategies 
such as the improvement of products and services quality provided, protection of 
cultural artefacts and dissemination of national trademarks (Sey et al., 2010). From this 
point of view, an increase of the IP registration and the enforcement of the IPRs 
protected per se do not ensure an increase in SMEs competitiveness. 
Although in small companies the use of informal protection mechanisms seems to be 
more profitable in terms of the appropriation of innovations returns, these appropriation 
methods are sometimes considered more valuable when they are complemented with 
some kind of IPRs protection (Thomä and Bizer, 2013). This demonstrates that the 
adoption of appropriation strategies that results from the combination of different 
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formal and informal protection mechanisms may be advantageous and that these 
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive.  
According Thomä and Bizer (2013), apart from the size of the companies a key factor in 
choosing formal or informal protection mechanisms, the business context (more 
innovative or less innovative) seems to be equally important. These authors suggest that 
the most innovative companies, due its greater investment in R&D, feel more need to 
protect their innovations with patents in order to achieve the returns of thereof, 
differently from the companies that invest less in innovation. Large companies use more 
often IPRs protection due their increased commitment to R&D. They are generally 
characterized by introducing new innovations to the market. In contrast, SMEs, due to 
their great responsiveness to fast-changing market conditions, usually bet in an 
incremental improvement of the quality of existing products and services focusing on 
the customer needs (Baldwin and Gellatly, 2003; Mazzarol and Reboud, 2009). As 
such, IPR protection arouses less attention. 
Moreover, appropriation strategies also differ depending on the type of innovation 
considered (Thomä and Bizer, 2013): product innovation or process innovation. These 
authors found that product innovations tend to be protected using informal protection 
methods or also IPRs. In turn, non-protection of process innovations seems to be 
equally effective as other appropriation strategy. 
Taking the arguments above, we hypothesize that: 
H2: The type of IPRs strategy - formal vs. informal - influences the competitiveness of 
the companies. 
H3: The size of the company intermediates the influence of IPRs protection on the 
competitiveness of that same company. 
H4: The innovation character of the company intermediates the influence of IPRs 
protection on the competitiveness of that same company. 
In summary, there are essentially three factors that influence the choice of IPRs 
protection as appropriation strategy by companies, which allows them to protect an 
innovation from imitation and achieve innovation returns improving their 
competitiveness: companies’ size, the innovation profile of the firm, and the business 
context (e.g., region, sector). Despite the importance that companies’ size seems to have 
in the choice of (formal or informal) protection mechanisms as competitive strategy, the 
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business context where the companies operate, and the innovation profile of the firm are 
equally important. Figure 1 shows the integrated conceptual framework and the 
hypotheses to be tested. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The integrated conceptual framework 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Aim of the study 
The present study intends specifically to assess the impact of IPRs protection 
mechanisms on startups’ competitiveness. Such purpose differs from that of the 
qualitative studies carried out by Reitzig (2004; 2007) and Sey et al. (2010), whose 
main aims were to explore IPRs protection management strategies. 
It targets Academic Spin-offs (ASOs), most precisely, startups located in science and 
technology parks and incubators. Despite the (seeming) importance of science and 
technology parks and incubators in the process of defining the best IPRs management, 
the topic of IPRs management and the extent to which it contributes to ASOs’ 
performance/competiveness has received little attention in the literature. It is not yet 
clear whether and which type of intellectual property protection mechanisms these 
startups choose and how these choices affect their performance/competitiveness (Stefan 
and Bengtsson, 2014).    
Given that no relevant information is publicly available on these issues, it was necessary 
to collect information from primary sources, the companies. We therefore collected 
information through a survey in a similar way of some authors who have made efforts to 
discover which appropriation strategies are chosen by small companies (e.g., Leiponen 
and Byma, 2009; Thomä and Bizer, 2013) and how these strategies affected firm 
performance (e.g., Calabrese et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2000; Laursen and Salter, 2005). 
Given our purpose, the most adequate methodology of analysis is the quantitative one 
(see Creswell, 2014), most notably causality/multivariate econometric techniques, 
which we detail futher ahead, in Section 3.3.  
Table 1 summarizes main studies analyzed and the respective methodologies of 
analysis.
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Table 1: Main studies analyzed and the respective methodologies of analysis  
Author(s) Aim of the study 
Data gathering 
methodology 
Methodology 
of analysis 
Techniques/ 
methods of 
analysis used 
Number of 
companies 
Period of 
reference 
Type of 
companies 
Sector 
Country of 
analysis 
Sey, Lowe and 
Poole (2010) 
To explore the use of IP, especially 
trademarks and industrial designs, by 
MSMEs in Ghana Interviews Qualitative 
Case studies 10 2010 MSME 
Textiles, garments, 
footwear, accessories, 
natural/herbal products and 
arts/crafts industries 
Ghana 
Reitzig (2004; 
2007) 
To understand how IPRs matters are 
managers by corporate IP managers 
- 34 2003-2005 Large - Copenhagen 
Thomä and 
Bizer (2013) 
To discover what appropriation 
strategies are chosen by innovative 
small companies 
Survey 
Quantitative 
Cluster analysis 
Factor analysis 
1624 2002-2004 
Small 
companies 
Manufacturing and service Germany 
Leiponen and 
Byma (2009) 
To examine small companies’ strategies 
for capturing returns to investments in 
innovation 
Multinomial 
logistic 
maximum 
likelihood 
936/830 2002/2003 
All economic sectors except 
agriculture, finance and real 
estate 
Finland 
Laursen and 
Salter (2005) 
To explore how legal (such as patents) 
and first mover (such as secrecy) 
appropriability strategies shape 
performance 
Tobit regression 
analysis 
2707 2001 
All Manufacturing 
UK 
Cohen, Nelson 
and Walsh 
(2000) 
To explore why companies patent 
despite reporting patents to be relatively 
ineffective (for most industries) in 
protecting returns to innovation 
Factor analysis 1165 1991-1993 US 
Calabrese, 
Baum and 
Silverman 
(2000) 
To analyze how incumbent 
biotechnology companies’ patenting and 
alliance-building activities shape rates 
of founding in the Canadian 
biotechnology industry 
Documentary 
analysis 
Poisson 
regression 
151 1991-1997 Startups Biotechnology Canada 
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3.2. Data gathering process 
3.1.2. Target population 
Due to the time and resources constraints, it would be impossible to include in this 
analysis all Academic Spin-offs (ASOs)/startups located in Portuguese science and 
technology parks and incubators. Notwithstanding, previous studies (see Teixeira, 2016) 
show that ASOs are concentrated in 4 main science and technology parks and 
incubators located in Portugal mainland: UPTEC, associated with University of Porto; 
Instituto Pedro Nunes (IPN) Incubator and TecBIS, associated with University of 
Coimbra; TAGUSPARK, associated with University of Lisbon; and UAlgCria 
associated with University of Algarve. Geographically, these four science parks cover 
all NUTs II region of Portugal mainland and encompass a set of diversified 
activities/business sectors. 
In order to select the companies to be anlysed we established a minimum period of three 
years in business in order to be able to get data from the three last years. Additionally, 
given that we were aiming startups we considered, in the line of the most recent 
‘European Startup Monitor’ (ESM, 2016), only those companies with ten or less years 
in business.  
3.2.2. Describing the survey 
The survey administered to the companies was built from scratch because there was no 
surveys developed in this research area that could serve as a model. Nevertheless, its 
construction was made from an extensive and updated literature review of the variables 
under analysis, which allowed that the drawing up of the survey were the more focused 
as possible to obtain only the information that were strictly necessary to reach the 
objectives of investigation. The concern with the brevity of the survey was also 
motivated by the need to achieve a reasonable response rate. 
We chose to elaborate an online survey6 for several reasons: great reach at the lowest 
possible cost - it allows to reach a large number of companies from different 
geographical locations almost with no cost; quality and reliability of answers - it allows 
people to respond at the time that it was most convenient to them, without the influence 
                                               
6 The Portuguese version of the online survey is available in https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1duIJM1-
uIp2I8ctAYx_c13R1lvPvoCF5OEi_RR-Lwoc/viewform. 
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of the researcher; highest profitability of time - it allows a real-time responses 
monitoring and to export collected information to a spreadsheet. 
Considering that the target respondents were Portuguese, the online survey was written 
in Portuguese. 
The survey’s structure includes 9 sections, being the first a brief introduction to the 
survey. The second section corresponds to the descriptive features of companies, 
including company name, 5 digit economic activity code, foundation year, number of 
employees and number of employees in full-time equivalent.  
The third section concerns the collection of information about the use and importance to 
the company of the assets protection mechanisms, namely patents, trademarks, 
industrial design, trade secret, geographical indications, copyright and rights related to 
copyright, lead time and complementary assets. 
The fourth section focuses on the major reasons for using these assets protection 
mechanisms, being suggested three main reasons (simplicity in the utilization and 
implementation, low cost and effectiveness in terms of protection), plus ‘other 
reason(s)’ (an open question).    
The fifth section refers to the purposes of using of the distinct types of assets protection 
mechanisms, including: attract funding; attract investment; obtain market power; use 
and exclusively commercialize a product or service; gain competitive advantage; protect 
an innovation from imitation and exploitation by competitors; increase market 
competitiveness; increase market share; and enter into the international markets. 
The remaining sections are related to other business indicators: sections six, seven and 
eight gather information about the turnover/sales (in Euros), gross value added (in 
Euros) and EBITDA value (in Euros) for the last three years. These sections were 
designed to measure the competitiveness in two dimensions – efficiency and 
effectiveness -, in line with Papalia et al. (2015). Efficiency related performance 
measure is the productivity (value added per employee), which is often used to measure 
competitiveness and is a good indicator of long term competitiveness (Reinert, 1995; 
Fischer and Schornberg, 2007). Accordingly, to measure efficiency of the companies 
we used average Gross Value Added (GVA) per capita for the last three years. 
Effectiveness is proxied by profitability which is reflected by company’s average 
EBITDA for the last three years.   
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Finally, section nine refers to R&D intensity and the weight of PhDs employees in total 
of employees.  
Table 2 summarizes the present study main variables and the corresponding relevant 
survey questions. 
Table 2: Present study main variables and the corresponding relevant survey questions 
 
3.2.3. Data gathering procedures 
Although the targeted companies were located in science and technology parks and 
incubators with online websites, the information about these companies was limited to 
their name, business sector and contacts. For this reason, the process of data collection 
was very time consuming, requiring a lot of effort and dedication over four months.  
The first phase of data collection was focused on gathering information about the 
foundation year of all companies located in science and technology parks and 
 Variable Theoretical Dimension Measure 
Sections in the online 
survey 
Question 
in the 
online 
survey 
Period of 
reference 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
Competitiv
eness 
Efficiency Productivity 
7. Other business indicators: 
gross value added (in Euros) 
35-37 
2013 - 2015 Effectiveness Profitability 
8. Other business indicators: 
EBITDA value (in Euros) 
38-40 
Growth Indicator 
Annual Change of 
Turnover 
6. Other business indicators: 
turnover/sales (in Euros) 
32-34 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
IPRs 
protection 
Formal and informal 
protection mechanisms: 
 Patents 
 Trademarks 
 Industrial design 
 Trade secret 
 Geographical 
indications 
 Copyright and rights 
related to copyright 
 Lead time 
 Complementary assets 
Use and 
importance 
3. Use and importance, to the 
company, the assets 
protection mechanisms 
6-13 
2006 - 2013 
Reasons for using 
4. Major reasons for using 
the assets protection 
mechanisms 
14-21 
Purposes of using 
5. Purposes of using the 
assets protection mechanisms 
22-31 
C
o
n
tr
o
l Descriptive 
features of 
companies 
Human capital 
Weight of PhDs 
employees in total 
of employees 9. Other business indicators 
42 
R&D intensity R&D intensity 41 
Business context  
(Sector and Region) 
Company name 
and 5 digit 
economic activity 
code 
2. Company description 1 e 2 
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incubators as only those in business at least three years but not more than ten were to be 
selected for further analysis. We built 4 databases (one for each park or incubator) 
containing the following information: company name, business sector, foundation year 
and contacts. These databases were built with information found in the online websites 
of the parks or incubators and, by reference, in the websites of the companies 
themselves, when existent.  
Finding the foundation year of the companies was not an easy task, since such 
information was, in general, inexistent in the parks or incubators’/companies’ websites. 
For this reason, it was necessary to establish email and phone contacts with the 
companies in order to obtain this information in a reliable manner.  
On the 17th February 2016 an email was sent to all relevant companies, totalling almost 
355 companies (168 from UPTEC, 57 from IPN, 110 from TAGUSPARK and 20 from 
UAlgCria).  
By email only 46 companies responded. Therefore, it was necessary to contact by phone 
all the companies that did not respond to the email in order to obtain information about 
their foundation year. This task was performed during nearly two months and it was 
completed on 31st March 2016.  
In the end of the first phase, we obtain the ‘effective’ target population, composed by 
162 startups of age equal or greater than three years and equal or inferior to ten years 
(82 from UPTEC, 31 from IPN, 37 from TAGUSPARK and 12 from UAlgCria). 
In order to harmonize the sector of activity we used the “Sistema de Informação da 
Classificação Portuguesa de Atividades Económicas” (SICAE),7 which is an online 
database that contains permanently updated and harmonized information about the code 
of activity of companies and similar entities. One by one each of the 162 startups 
activity codes were checked. Given that in some cases (17) there was a discrepancy 
between the name of companies disclosed in the online websites of the parks or 
incubators and name used in its commercial register, no result emerged from the online 
platform. Again, we contacted the companies by phone in order to solve the 
discrepancy. 
Once this was done, we started preparing the online survey as well as the email to send 
to the companies. On the 28th April 2016, we sent an email to the 162 companies 
                                               
7 Available in http://www.sicae.pt/Consulta.aspx.  
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corresponding to our ‘effective’ target population asking them to cooperate in the online 
survey – the email letter is in Appendix A2.  
Only 8 companies responded to the email in a period of one week. For this reason, on 
5th May 2016 we sent a reminder encouraging companies to participate in the survey. 
Only 4 companies responded after one week of the reminder. Therefore, we decided to 
contact by phone all the (150) companies which had not previously responded. During 
almost two and a half weeks we dedicate our time to call each company, every working 
day from 2 p.m. until to 6:30 p.m..  
In the first phone contact to the companies we started presenting us and presenting our 
research project, asking to be in contact with the person responsible for the company 
and/or a collaborator able to fill in the questionnaire. When in contact with that person, 
we again presented our research project. After this phone contact we got 11 additional 
answers. By this stage, we had 23 responses. 
After few days, we established a second phone contact to the 139 companies that had 
not yet responded. This time we asked immediately to talk to the person with whom we 
spoke previously. This second phone contact was more fruitful, managing to obtain 26 
additional responses. By then, 49 responses were obtained. 
Due to time constraints (the need to meet the deadlines of the dissertation - end of June 
2016), we decided to close the data gathering procedures by the end of May. Therefore, 
in the last week of May we establish a third and last contact with 113 remaining 
companies trying to obtain a maximum possible responses to the survey. Given the 
persistence of our contacts, some companies started to show some discontent. After this 
last phone contact we got 6 additional responses, which made a total of 55 responses. 
Due to incomplete responses, we had to exclude 7 responses. Thus, in the end of this 
process we got a final number of 48 responses to the survey - 23 from UPTEC, 8 from 
IPN, 10 from TAGUSPARK and 7 from UAlgCria -, representing an effective rate of 
response of 30%. The sample is fairly representative by technological 
infrastructure/location (see Table 3). 
In our final database, each company was match to its park or incubator and the 
economic activity code to its designation, by consulting the “Classificação Portuguesa 
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das Atividades Económicas, Revisão 3”, available in an online metadata system by the 
National Statistical Institute.8   
In order to complete some economic data not answered in the survey, we used Sabi 
database, an online database which provides complete information of financial analysis 
of Portuguese and Spanish companies with a history of annual accounts up to 25 years.9  
Table 3: Representativess of the sample 
S&T parks or incubators 
Target population Sample Rate of 
responses 
N % n % (n/N) % 
UPTEC 82 51 23 48 28 
IPN 31 19 8 17 26 
TAGUSPARK 37 23 10 21 27 
UAlgCria 12 7 7 14 58 
Total 162 100 48 100 30 
 
Lastly, we have established further phone contacts with some companies to clarify some 
data.  
Figure 2 highlights the main tasks performed during the process of data collection as 
well as the time devoted to each of them. 
 
3.3. Model specification 
In order to complement the descriptive analysis and answer to the research question put 
forward – Do IPRs protection mechanisms matter for ASOs competitiveness? -, the 
present study resorts to a multivariate econometric model, more specifically, a logistic 
regression. In concrete, this estimation procedure enables us to assess how the various 
determinants, most noticeably IPRs, affects companies’ competitivess. 
According to our theoretical framework (see Figure 1), IPRs, IPRs types and the 
interaction between IPRs mechanisms and companies size and innovation profile is 
likely to impact of companies’ competitivess taking into account business context 
(sector and region) and companies’ human capital endowments. 
                                               
8 Available in http://smi.ine.pt/Categoria. 
9 Available in SIGARRA from FEP in Electronic Resources: Statistical and Financial Databases. 
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Legend: ~~~~~ February; ******* March; --------- April; • • • • May 
Figure 2: Main tasks performed during the process of data collection and time devoted to each of them 
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Our dependent variable ‘Top competitive company versus Non top competitive 
company’ is a dummy-variable which assumes the value of 1 when the company is 
classified as top competitive in terms of three main economic indicators: sales per 
capita, gross value added (GVA) per capita and EBITDA. We considered the averages 
of these indicators over the three years period 2013-2015. To compute the top 
companies we took into account the percentile distribution of the three main indicators 
and considered the top 25% and top 50%. We thus have 6 distinct indicators for the 
dependent variable.  
Being our dependent variable a dummy the adequate estimation model is the logistic 
regression because we cannot expect a normal distribution and we need to interpret the 
results as probabilities - this would not be possible with a conventional (OLS) 
estimation technique.10 Therefore we resort to the general framework of probabilistic 
models. 
According to the conceptual model the ‘propensity of being top competitive’, as 
referred earlier (cf. Section 2), depends on a set of determinants, most notably, IPRs 
mechanisms usage, the type of IPRs mechanism, the interaction between the use of IPRs 
and companies’ size and innovativeness, human capital, R&D intensity, and business 
context (region and sector). These ‘explanatory’ variables are gathered in a vector X, 
which explains the outcome, so that: 
),(1)0(Pr),()1(Pr  XFYobandXFYob  . 
The set of parameters  reflects the impact of changes in X on the likelihood of ‘top 
competitiveness’. 
The empirical assessment of the propensity of top competitiveness is based on the 
estimation of the following general logistic regression: 
𝑷(𝑻𝒐𝒑 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒔) =
𝟏
𝟏 + 𝒆−𝒁
 
With 
𝒁 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑰𝑷𝑹 𝒖𝒔𝒆 + 𝜷𝟐𝑰𝑷𝑹 𝒕𝒚𝒑𝒆𝒔 + 𝜷𝟑(𝑰𝑷𝑹 × 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑰𝑷𝑹 × 𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔) + 𝜷𝟓𝑯𝑪
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑹&𝑫 + 𝜷𝟕𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓 + 𝜷𝟖𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 𝜺𝒊 
                                               
10 The distribution of errors is not normal and the predicted values cannot be interpreted as probabilities – 
they are not constrained to fall in the interval between 0 and 1. 
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Rewritten in terms of the odds (ratio of the probability that the event occurs to the 
probability of the event not occurring) of an event occurring, the logit model becomes: 
 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 (
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝑻𝒐𝒑 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒔)
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝒏𝒐𝒏 𝑻𝒐𝒑𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒔)
) =
= 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑰𝑷𝑹 𝒖𝒔𝒆 + 𝜷𝟐𝑰𝑷𝑹 𝒕𝒚𝒑𝒆𝒔 + 𝜷𝟑(𝑰𝑷𝑹 × 𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆)
+ 𝜷𝟒(𝑰𝑷𝑹 × 𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔) + 𝜷𝟓𝑯𝑪 + 𝜷𝟔𝑹&𝑫 + 𝜷𝟕𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓 + 𝜷𝟖𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 𝜺𝒊 
 
The logistic coefficient can be interpreted as the change in the log odds associated with 
a one-unit change in the independent variable. Then e raised to the power i is the factor 
by which the odds change when the ith independent variable increases by one unit. If i 
is positive, this factor will be greater than 1, which means that the odds are increased; if 
i is negative, the factor will be less than one, which means that the odds are decreased. 
When i is 0, the factor equals 1, which leaves the odds unchanged.  
The next section details the empirical results obtained by the statistical treatment of the 
gathered data. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive results 
Of the 48 respondent companies (23 from UPTEC, 8 from IPN, 10 from TAGUSPARK 
and 7 from UAlgCria), we found that 73.6% of these companies use informal protection 
mechanisms while 49.6% use formal protection mechanisms. In more detail, the 
informal protection mechanisms that are mostly used are the complementary assets and 
the lead time, whereas the most used formal protection mechanisms are the copyright 
and rights related with copyright and the trademarks (see Figure 3).     
 
 
Figure 3: Average use of IPRs by companies 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups. 
 
Regardless the type of formal and informal IPRs protection mechanisms, the companies 
that use them justify their use by the effectiveness they bare in terms of protection (see 
Figure 4). This is particularly the case for patents (83% of the companies that use this 
IPR state that it is due to its effectiveness), trademarks (76%), and geographical 
indications (73%). The simplicity in the utilization and implementation is particularly 
important for 63% of the companies that use industrial designs. Low cost is only 
important for a reduced number of companies, and to a higher extent for companies that 
use trade secrets (21%), copyright and rights related to copyright (20%) and trademarks 
(19%). 
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Figure 4: Number of companies that uses the IPR mechanism (right scale) and reasons for choosing 
each IPR mechanism (in % of the total number of companies that use the mechanism) 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups. 
It is important to analyse at this stage whether the differences on the average use of 
IPRs are contigent on a set of variables that characterize the companies, most notably: 
region (i.e., science and technology (S&T) park or incubator where companies operate), 
age, human capital, R&D intensity, existence of PhDs collaborators, and sector. 
Regarding the region, we verify that both formal and informal protection mechanisms 
are more used by companies of IPN, although informal mechanisms are also widely 
used by companies of UAlgCria (see Table 4). 
Considering formal protection mechanisms: patents are more used by companies of 
UPTEC and IPN; trademarks assume an average percentage of use similar for 
companies of all S&T parks or incubators, except Taguspark; industrial design are more 
used by companies of IPN; geographical indications are more used by companies of 
UAlgCria following companies of Taguspark; and copyrights and rights related to 
copyright are used in a similar extent by companies of all S&T parks or incubators.  
Regarding informal protection mechanisms: trade secret are more used by companies of 
IPN and lead time and complementary assets take an average use in a similar proportion 
by companies of all S&T parks or incubators, with maximum value for companies of 
UAlgCria. 
Notwithstanding the differences observed on the average use of IPRs by regions, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test allows us to conclude that these differences are statistically 
significant (at the 5% of significance) only for the use of industrial design.  
To analyze if there were differences on the average use of IPRs according to the age of 
the companies, we grouped them into 3 age groups: 3-4 years, 5-7 years, and 8-10 years. 
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Table 4: Average use of IPRs by companies considering the region 
IPRs UPTEC IPN 
Taguspar
k 
UAlgCria 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
test 
(p-value) 
Patents 34.8% 37.5% 10.0% 0.0% 0.154 
Trademarks 82.6% 87.5% 50.0% 85.7% 0.156 
Industrial design 13.0% 50.0% 0.0% 14.3% 0.037** 
Geographical indications 39.1% 37.5% 60.0% 71.4% 0.372 
Copyrights and rights related to 
copyright 
78.3% 87.5% 80.0% 85.7% 0.933 
Trade secret 60.9% 87.5% 40.0% 57.1% 0.247 
Lead time 69.6% 87.5% 70.0% 100.0% 0.318 
Complementary assets  78.3% 87.5% 80.0% 100.0% 0.580 
Formal 49.6% 60.0% 40.0% 51.4% 0.397 
Informal 69.6% 87.5% 63.3% 85.7% 0.235 
Note: ** Statistically significant at 5%. 
 
We found that informal protection mechanisms are used in a similar extent by 
companies of all age groups while formal protection mechanisms seem to be more used 
by companies that are included in the age groups of 3-4 years and 5-7 years (see Figure 
5). 
Considering formal protection mechanisms, patents and industrial design are more used 
by younger companies (3-4 years), trademarks are more used by older companies (8-10 
years), and geographical indications are more used by younger and middle age 
companies (3-4, 5-7 years) as well as copyrights and rights related to copyright.  
Considering informal protection mechanisms, trade secret assumes an identical average 
use by companies of all age groups, whereas lead time is more used by middle age 
companies (5-7 years) and complementary assets are more used by older companies (8-
10 years).  
Again, despite the differences observed, Kruskal-Wallis test leads us to conclude that 
these differences are statistically significant (at the 10% of significance) only for the use 
of copyrights and rights related to copyright. 
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Figure 5: Average use of IPRs by companies considering the age 
Note: * Statistically significant at 10%. 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups. 
In turn, we checked if there were differences on the average use of IPRs considering the 
companies’ size, i.e., the number of collaborators that each company employs. Similarly 
to the previous variable (age), we grouped the companies into 3 categories taking into 
account the number of employees that they had: up to 3 collaborators, 4-9 collaborators, 
and 10 or more collaborators.  
We found that informal protection mechanisms are more used by very small companies 
(those that have up to 3 collaborators), while formal protection mechanisms are more 
used by both very small companies and the largest ones (with 10 or more collaborators) 
(see Figure 6). 
Considering formal protection mechanisms, patents and trademarks are more used by 
larger companies (with 10 or more collaborators), industrial design and geographical 
indications are more used both by smaller (up to 3 collaborators) and larger companies 
(10 or more collaborators), and copyrights and rights related to copyright are more used 
by smaller companies (up to 3 collaborators).   
Regarding the informal protection mechanisms, trade secret seems to be more used by 
larger companies (10 or more collaborators) and lead time and complementary assets 
are more used by smaller companies (up to 3 collaborators).   
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Applying Kruskal-Wallis test, we demonstrate that none of the differences observed 
were statistically significant. 
 
Figure 6: Average use of IPRs by companies considering the human capital 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups. 
 
In order to verify whether there were differences on the average use of IPRs according 
to companies’ R&D intensity, we grouped the companies into 2 groups: companies with 
R&D intensity less than or equal to 50% and companies with R&D intensity above 
50%. 
We found that both formal and informal protection mechanisms are more used by 
highly R&D intensive companies, being such difference (according to Kruskal-Wallis 
test) statistically significant (at the 1% of significance) (see Figure 7). 
We found that all protection mechanisms (formal and informal) are more used by highly 
R&D intensive companies and that these differences, with exception of the patents, 
copyrights and rights related to copyright and for complementary assets, are statistically 
significant.   
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Figure 7: Average use of IPRs by companies considering the R&D intensity 
Note: *** (**) [*]: Statistically significant at 1% (5%) [10%]. 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups.  
 
Grouping companies into two categories, those that have PhDs collaborators and those 
that do not, we verified that informal and formal protection mechanisms are more used 
by companies that have at least one PhD collaborator. Applying Kruskal-Wallis test, we 
noticed that differences are only statistically significant (at the 1% of significance) for 
the use of informal protection mechanisms (see Figure 8). 
Formal protection mechanisms, namely patents, trademarks and geographical 
indications are more used by companies that have at least one PhD collaborator, while 
industrial design and copyrights and rights related to copyright are more used by 
companies have not any PhD collaborator. 
In respect to informal protection mechanisms, all of them are more used by companies 
that have at least one PhD collaborator.  
Despite the differences observed, Kruskal-Wallis test demonstrates that these 
differences are only statistically significant at 10% of significance for the use of patents 
and at 1% for the use of trade secrets. 
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Figure 8: Average use of IPRs by companies considering the existence of PhDs collaborators 
Note: *** (*): Statistically significant at 1% (10%). 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups.  
 
To check the differences on the average use of IPRs by sector, we grouped the 
companies into 4 categories: ‘Computing and related’, ‘Architecture, Design and R&D 
activities’, ‘Retail and wholesale’, and ‘Other’.  
According Table 5, informal protection mechanisms are more used by companies 
dedicated to ‘Retail and wholesale’ and ‘Other’ business activities, while formal 
protection mechanisms are more used only by companies dedicated to ‘Other’ business 
activities. 
Within formal protection mechanisms, patents are more used by companies dedicated to 
‘Architecture, design and R&D activities’ and ‘Other’ business activities, whereas 
trademarks and geographical indications are more used by companies dedicated to 
‘Computing and related’ and ‘Other’ business activities. Industrial designs are more 
used by companies dedicated to ‘Other’ business activities, and copyrights and rights 
related to copyright are more used by companies dedicated to ‘Computing and related’ , 
‘Retail and wholesale’ and ‘Other’ business activities.       
Regarding to informal protection mechanisms, all of them are more used by companies 
dedicated to ‘Retail and wholesale’ and ‘Other’ business activities.  
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Despite the differences observed, Kruskal-Wallis test evidences that these differences 
are only statistically significant at the 10% of significance for the use of industrial 
design and at the 5% for the use of geographical indications.  
Table 5: Average use of IPRs according to companies’ sector 
IPRs 
Computing 
and 
related 
Architectu
re, design 
and R&D 
activities 
Retail/ 
Wholesale 
Other 
Kruskal-
Wallis test 
(p-value) 
Patents 21.1% 30.0% 16.7% 33.3% 0.863 
Trademarks 84.2% 75.0% 50.0% 100.0% 0.273 
Industrial design 15.8% 15.0% 0.0% 66.7% 0.089* 
Geographical indications 31.6% 45.0% 83.3% 100.0% 0.042** 
Copyrights and rights 
related to copyright 
84.2% 75.0% 83.3% 100.0% 0.728 
Trade secret 63.2% 55.0% 66.7% 66.7% 0.931 
Lead time 68.4% 75.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.326 
Complementary assets  78.9% 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.537 
 
Formal 47.4% 48.0% 46.7% 80.0% 0.234 
Informal 70.2% 70.0% 88.9% 88.9% 0.737 
Note: ** (*): Statistically significant at 5% (10%). 
 
We further analyse whether the differences on the average use of IPRs are dependent on 
companies’ competitiveness, as measured by 3 indicators: average sales per capita, 
average Gross Value Added (GVA) per capita, and average Earnings Before Interest, 
Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA). In order to do that we considered the 
top 25% and top 50% more competitive companies.   
In case of the average sales per capita, the top 25% more competitive companies are 
those which have an average sales per capita above 44.166,70 €, while the top 50% 
more competitive companies are those which have an average sales per capita above 
22.991,90 €. 
Considering the top 25% more competitive companies, we found that both formal and 
informal protection mechanisms are more used by least competitive companies, being 
such difference (according Kruskal-Wallis test) statistically significant at the 5% of 
significance for formal protection mechanisms and at 10% for informal protection 
mechanisms (see Figure 9). 
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We also uncovered that all protection mechanisms (formal and informal) are more used 
by least competitive companies. However, despite the differences observed, Kruskal-
Wallis test evidences that these differences are only statistically significant, at the 10% 
of significance, for the use of trademarks, industrial design, lead time and 
complementary assets.  
 
Figure 9: Average use of IPRs by companies considering top 25% more competitive companies 
according average sales per capita  
Note: ** (*): Statistically significant at 5% (10%). 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups. 
Regarding the top 50% more competitive companies, we found that both formal and 
informal protection mechanisms are more used by least competitive companies, being 
such difference (according Kruskal-Wallis test) statistically significant at the 1% of 
significance for formal protection mechanisms and at 5% for informal protection 
mechanisms (see Figure 10). 
We also found that all protection mechanisms (formal and informal) are more used by 
least competitive companies. However, despite the differences observed, Kruskal-
Wallis test evidences that these differences are only statistically significant at the 10% 
of significance for the use of trademarks and copyrights and rights related to copyright, 
and, at 1%, for the use of patents, industrial design and trade secret. 
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Figure 10: Average use of IPRs by companies considering top 50% more competitive companies 
according average sales per capita  
Note: *** (**) [*]: Statistically significant at 1% (5%) [10%]. 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups.  
In the case of the average GVA per capita, the top 25% more competitive companies are 
those with an average GVA per capita above 34.203,60 €, while the top 50% more 
competitive companies are those with that indicator above 7.525,20 €. 
For both groups of companies, we found that both formal and informal protection 
mechanisms are more used by least competitive companies, being such difference 
(according Kruskal-Wallis test) only statistically significant at the 5% of significance 
for informal protection mechanisms (see Figure 11 e 12). 
Considering the top 25% more competitive companies, formal protection mechanisms 
such as patents, geographical indicators and copyrights and rights related to copyright 
assume an average use equivalent among the most and least competitive companies. In 
turn, trademarks and industrial design are more used by least competitive companies. 
In respect to informal protection mechanisms, all of them are more used by least 
competitive companies, being such differences (according Kruskal-Wallis test) 
statistically significant at the 10% of significance for the use of trade secret and at the 
5% for the use of lead time and complementary assets. 
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Figure 11: Average use of IPRs by companies considering top 25% more competitive companies 
according average GVA per capita  
Note: ** (*): Statistically significant at 5% (10%). 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups.  
 
Taking into account the top 50% more competitive companies, we found that all 
protection mechanisms (formal and informal) are more used by least competitive 
companies, being such differences (according Kruskal-Wallis test) only statistically 
significant for the use of the informal protection mechanisms: at the 5% of significance 
for the use of trade secret and at the 10% for the use of lead time and complementary 
assets (see Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: Average use of IPRs by companies considering 50% more competitive companies 
according average GVA per capita  
Note: ** (*): Statistically significant at 5% (10%). 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups.  
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In the case of average EBITDA, the top 25% more competitive companies are those 
which have an average EBITDA above 40.783,70 €, while the top 50% have a 
corresponding indicator of 6.427,70 €.  
Considering the top 25% more competitive companies, we found that both formal and 
informal protection mechanisms are more used by least competitive companies (see 
Figure 13). We further uncover that all formal protection mechanisms are more used by 
least competitive companies, except geographical indications which assume an average 
use equivalent among the most and least competitive companies.  
Applying Kruskal-Wallis test, we demonstrate that none of the differences observed are 
statistically significant. 
 
Figure 13: Average use of IPRs by companies considering 25% more competitive companies 
according average EBITDA indicator 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups. 
 
Considering the top 50% more competitive companies, we found that both formal and 
informal protection mechanisms are more used by least competitive companies, being 
such difference (according Kruskal-Wallis test) statistically significant at the 10% of 
significance both protection mechanisms (see Figure 14). 
We also observe that all protection mechanisms (formal and informal) are more used by 
least competitive companies. However, despite the differences observed, Kruskal-
Wallis test evidences that these differences are only statistically significant, at the 10% 
of significance, for the use of trademarks and, at the 5%, for the use of trade secret.  
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Figure 14: Average use of IPRs by companies considering top 50% more competitive companies 
according average EBITDA  
Note: ** (*): Statistically significant at 5% (10%). 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups. 
To finalize our descriptive analysis we explored, in isolation, whether the IPRs strategy 
– formal, informal or blend - is associated with companies’ competitiveness. 
First, we tested whether there were differences on competitiveness indicators – average 
sales per capita, average GVA per capita, and average EBITDA - considering the 
simultaneous use of formal and informal protection mechanisms (i.e., blend strategy).  
In order to do that we grouped the companies into 2 groups, considering whether they 
opted for a blend strategy or not: simultaneous use of formal and informal protection 
mechanisms and other (do not use any protection mechanism; uses formal/informal 
protection mechanismsin isolation).  
We verified that, regardless of the competitiveness indicator considered, the strategy of 
not using any protection mechanism or using formal/informal protection mechanisms in 
isolation tends to be associated with higher competitiveness compared to the strategy of 
using simultaneously formal and informal protection mechanisms (see Figure 15). 
Nevertheless, Kruskal-Wallis test evidences that these differences are only statistically 
significant, at the 1% of significance, for average sales per capita and, at the 5%, for 
average GVA per capita. 
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Figure 15: Differences on competitiveness indicators considering the use of formal and informal 
protection mechanisms simultaneously 
Note: *** (**): Statistically significant at 1% (5%). 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups.  
 
Then, we went to check out whether there were differences on competitiveness 
indicators considering IPRs protection strategy, i.e., each of the above mentioned 
possibilities: do not use any protection mechanism, uses only informal protection 
mechanisms, uses only formal protection mechanisms and use of formal and informal 
protection mechanisms simultaneously.  
More specifically, we verified that the companies that do not use any protection 
mechanism have a higher sales and GVA per capita compared to those that use some 
kind of protection, while those that use only formal protection mechanisms have a 
higher average EBITDA compared to those which opt for any of the other possibilities. 
Notwithstanding, Kruskal-Wallis test evidences that these differences are only 
statistically significant, at the 5% of significance, for the average sales per capita and 
the average GVA per capita (see Figure 16).  
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Figure 16: Differences on competitiveness indicators considering the IPRs protection strategy 
Note: **: Statistically significant at 5%. 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups. 
 
Lastly, we analyse the purposes of the use of IPRs mechanisms considering the degree 
of importance attributed by respondent companies. 
Companies mentioned that the main purpose when they protect their assets is to gain 
competitive advantage (4.146 score in a scale from 1 to 5). To enter into the 
international market, to exclusively use and commercialize a product or service and to 
attract investment are also important purposes that lead to IPRs protection by companies 
(importance of 3.750 on a scale from 1 to 5) (see Figure 17).  
 
 
Figure 17: Degree of importance (1: low…5: high) attributed to the given purposes of the use of 
IPRs mechanisms 
Source: Own computation base on primary data gathered from 48 startups. 
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Considering the competitiveness indicators, we checked whether there were differences 
in companies’ competitiveness according to the degree of importance attributed by 
respondent companies to the main purposes of the use of IPRs mechanisms. 
The top 25% performers by sales and GVA (see Table 6) attributed less importance, 
compared with the less competitive companies, to the purposes such as attracting 
funding, attracting investment, to obtain market power, to gain competitive advantage, 
to increase market share and to enter into international markets. Notwithstanding, 
Kruskal-Wallis test evidences that these differences are only statiscally significant (at 
the 5% of significance) for the purpose of to attract funding. 
The top 50% performers by sales, compared to the remaining companies, attributed less 
importance to the purposes such as attract funding, attract investment, obtain market 
power, gain competitive advantage, protect an innovation from imitation and 
exploitation by competitors, increase market share and enter into international markets 
and a higher importance to the remaining purposes. Kruskal-Wallis test evidences, 
however, shows that these differences are only statiscally significant (at 10% of 
significance) for the purpose of attracting funding and of attracting investment (at 5%).   
Compared with the non-top 50% performers, the top 50% performers in terms of 
average GVA per capita attributed less importance to attract funding, attract investment, 
obtain market power, increase market share and enter into international markets and 
attributed higher importance to the remaining purposes.  
 Regarding average EBITDA top (25% and 50%) performers attributed less importance 
to attract funding, attract investment, obtain market power, and enter into international 
markets and a higher importance to the remaining. Despite the differences observed, 
applying Kruskal-Wallis we demonstrate that none of the differences observed are 
statistically significant for the last 3 indicators.  
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Table 6: Main purposes of the use of IPRs mechanisms: degree of importance (1: low …5: high) attributed by respondent companies 
 
Sales per capita 
(top25%) 
Sales per capita 
(top50%) 
GVA per capita 
(top25%) 
GVA per capita 
(top50%) 
EBITDA  
(top25%) 
EBITDA  
(top50%) 
  
Non top 
perf 
Top perf 
Non top 
perf 
Top perf 
Non top 
perf 
Top perf 
Non top 
perf 
Top perf 
Non top 
perf 
Top perf 
Non top 
perf 
Top perf 
Attract funding 3.722 2.667** 3.833 3.083* 3.676 2.727** 3.760 3.130 3.568 3.091 3.640 3.261 
Attract investment 3.917 3.250 4.167 3.333** 3.811 3.545 3.840 3.652 3.757 3.727 3.840 3.652 
Obtain market power 3.861 3.333 3.833 3.625 3.784 3.545 3.880 3.565 3.784 3.545 3.760 3.696 
Exclusively use and 
commercialize a product or 
service 
3.722 3.833 3.708 3.792 3.649 4.091 3.680 3.826 3.676 4.000 3.520 4.000 
Gain competitive advantage 4.194 4.000 4.292 4.000 4.162 4.091 4.040 4.261 4.108 4.273 4.120 4.174 
Protect an innovation from 
imitation and exploitation 
by competitors 
3.639 3.750 3.708 3.625 3.595 3.909 3.600 3.739 3.622 3.818 3.600 3.739 
Increase market 
competitiveness 
3.667 3.750 3.667 3.708 3.676 3.727 3.640 3.739 3.622 3.909 3.680 3.696 
Increase market share 3.583 3.333 3.583 3.458 3.622 3.182 3.600 3.435 3.514 3.545 3.520 3.522 
Enter into international 
markets 
3.861 3.417 3.917 3.583 3.838 3.455 3.840 3.652 3.757 3.727 3.840 3.652 
Note: ***(**)[*]: differences between non-top performers and top performers (Kruskal Wallis test) statistically significant at 1%(5%)[10%]. 
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4.2. Causality analysis: does IPRs protection matter for companies’ 
competitiveness? 
The estimation of the econometric model was carried out resorting to logistic 
regressions that aimed, in a multivariate setting, to assess the impact of IPRs protection 
mechanisms on the competitiveness of the 48 startups located in four science and 
technology parks over the period 2013-2015.  
Given that there are some high correlations between independent variables, namely lead 
time and complementary assets, the estimated models included these variables 
separately to avoid multicollinearity issues. According to the conceptual model (see 
Figure 1), the specifications were estimated with and without the interaction variables. 
Table 7 presents a selection of the estimated econometric specifications. 11  The 
indicators of the goodness of fit evidence that all models are adequate: both the R2 and 
the percentage of observations estimated correctly are very high; moreover, excluding 
the Model 2B, the Hosmer and Lemshow test indicates that the remaining models 
represent the reality well. 
Estimation results demonstrate that, in general, IPRs protection is not positively related 
to the companies’ competitiveness, at least directly, which contradicts our Hypothesis 1 
(Companies that protect their assets are more competitive). Indeed, when the estimated 
coefficient is statistically significant (Model 1C, in Table 7), the use of formal 
protection mechanisms impacts negatively on companies’ competitiveness. 
Additionally, informal IPR mechanisms indirectly (through R&D) negatively impact on 
companies’ competitivess.  
When we discriminate the IPRs protection mechanisms by type used by companies we 
got quite varied results. In general, we found that the use of informal protection 
mechanisms, most notably, trade secrets and lead time, foster companies’ 
competitiveness, whereas the use of formal protection mechanisms, in particular, 
patents, trademarks and geographical indications, negatively impact that same 
competitiveness (see Table 7, Models 2B and 2D).  
These results support Hypotheses 2, The type of IPRs strategy - formal vs. informal - 
influences the competitiveness of the companies. 
                                               
11  Tables A1 to A6 in the Appendix present the full estimations for the top 25% and 50% more 
competitive companies according to the three competitiveness indicators considered.   
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In relation to the interaction variables, estimation results convey that the impact on 
companies’ competitivess of informal protection mechanisms is higher the smaller is the 
company’s size.12 Regarding the formal protection mechanisms (see Table 7, Models 
2B), their impact on companies’ competitiveness is stronger the larger is the company. 
Such results corroborate Hypothesis 3, The size of the company intermediates the 
influence of IPRs protection on the competitiveness of that same company.  
Lastly, informal protection mechanisms tend to increase the companies’ competitivess 
the least intensive in R&D is the company (see Models 1B and 1C, in Table 7). In 
contrast, the higher is the R&D intensity of a company, the stronger is the positive 
impact of formal protection mechanisms on companies’ competitiveness (see Models 
1B, 2B and 2D, in Table 7). This confirms Hypothesis 4, The innovation profile of the 
company intermediates the influence of IPRs protection on the competitiveness of that 
same company. 
 
 
                                               
12 Considering the top 50% most competitive companies according to the average GVA per capita, we 
obtained the opposite result, although at the limit of the statistical significance (p-value = 0,093) (see 
Table 7, Model 1B). 
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Table 7: Preferable models by indicator for the causality analysis: Does IPRs protection matter for companies’ competitiveness? 
  
Salespc25 Salespc50 GVApc25 GVApc50 EBITDA25 EBITDA50 
Model 2B Model 1C Model 1B Model 1B Model 2B Model 2D 
beta p-value beta p-value beta p-value beta p-value beta p-value beta p-value 
IP
R
 u
se
 
Informal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Trade secret (dummy=1 if the firm uses 
this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
7.271 0.051 
-0.446 0.809 -0.078 0.968 -2.385 0.151 
4.734 0.074 -2.978 0,051 
Lead time (dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
15.393 0.040 12.524 0.024 2.061 0,161 
Complementary assets  (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
            
Formal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Patents (dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-14.794 0.088 
-4.438 0.054 0.668 0.807 0.330 0.899 
-21.313 0.019 -3.062 0,083 
Trademarks (dummy=1 if the firm uses 
this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-5.810 0.078 -7.019 0.029 -2.860 0,053 
Industrial design (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-35.400 0.995 -14.893 0.034 1.004 0,659 
Geographical indications (dummy=1 if 
the firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-11.249 0.021 -0.859 0.638 0.425 0,750 
Copyrights and rights related to 
copyright (dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-12.932 0.060 -12.698 0.019 -0.690 0,588 
  
Interaction 
between IPRs 
type and 
Size/type of 
innovation 
Informal*size -12.440 0.052 1.462 0.366 -2.128 0.430 2.978 0.093 -9.479 0.029     
Informal*ID -13.705 0.211 -7.354 0.087 -33.477 0.086 -11.198 0.069 -12.493 0.116     
Formal*size 34.070 0.031     1.211 0.745 -3.671 0.112 15.829 0.021 -1.171 0,605 
Formal*ID -28.103 0.105     48.278 0.052 16.298 0.052 63.808 0.036 8.675 0,071 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s Companies' 
characteristics 
Age (ln) -0.042 0.988 2.716 0.033 2.325 0.176 1.706 0.107 -0.920 0.591 0.754 0,491 
Size (ln) -2.870 0.432 -1.106 0.347 0.060 0.963 -0.488 0.663 2.392 0.154 0.740 0,533 
Human capital (dummy=1 if the firm 
employs at least one PhD; 0 otherwise) 
-3.281 0.248 -0.482 0.688 1.820 0.425 -0.868 0.417 -3.507 0.071 2.259 0,195 
R&D intensity (dummy=1 if the firm has 
a R&D intensity above 50%) 
-1.169 0.884 1.880 0.466 -10.645 0.143 -1.756 0.383 -24.027 0.031 -4.717 0,052 
Context 
Sector (dummy=1 if the companies 
operates in Computing sector; 0 
otherwise) 
-4.025 0.115 -2.602 0.028 0.806 0.640 0.966 0.349 -0.404 0.795 -0.905 0,449 
Region (dummy=1 if the firm is located 
in UPTEC; 0 otherwise) 
2.759 0.185 0.938 0.416 -2.773 0.083 -0.565 0.515 -0.335 0.821 2.308 0,055 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Top competitiveness companies 12 24 12 23 11 23 
Other 36 24 36 25 37 25 
Godness of fit 
Adjusted R2 0.790 0.667 0.612 0.442 0.559 0.434 
Hosmer and Lameshow Test (p-value) 33.851 0.000 5.104 0.746 4.729 0.786 11.377 0,187 2,789 0,947 7,283 0,506 
% correct 97.9 87.5 85.4 72.9 85.4 72.9 
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5. Conclusions  
5.1. Main results and contribution for scientific knowledge 
The analysis of the purposes of the use of IPRs mechanisms by respondent companies 
revealed that they protect their assets mainly to gain competitive advantage, as sustained 
by the most recent literature (see Singh, 2015). Validating other previous studies (e.g., 
Glass and Saggi, 2002; Smarzynska, 2004), companies reported that the attraction of 
investment was also an essential purpose that led them to IPRs protection. Equally 
important for Academic Spin-offs to undertake IPR protection was the purposes of 
entering into the international market and to exclusively use and commercialize a 
product or service. Additionally, we found that the most competitive companies are 
those that attribute lower importance to attract funding and to attract investment and a 
higher importance to obtain market power, exclusively use and commercialize a product 
or service, gain competitive advantage, protect an innovation from imitation and 
exploitation by competitors, increase market competitiveness, increase market share, 
and enter into international markets. This suggests that the most competitive Academic 
Spin-offs (ASOs) effectively recognize the importance of IPRs protection to gain 
competitive advantage and not just for accessing or grant additional financial sources. 
Regardless the type of IPRs protection mechanisms (formal or informal), the companies 
that use them justify their use by the effectiveness they bare in terms of protection, 
particularly in the case of patents – as expected for small companies that invest heavily 
in R&D (Thomä and Bizer, 2013) such as ASOs - and trademarks (Singh, 2015), but 
also in the case of geographical indications. We further found that the simplicity in the 
utilization and implementation is particularly important for companies that use 
industrial designs, being low cost the least important reason for deciding to protect their 
IPRs.  
The results of the present study established that, in general, the most competitive 
companies are those that use less formal IPRs protection. Moreover, when we 
discriminate the IPRs protection mechanisms by type we found that the use of informal 
protection mechanisms, most notably, lead time and trade secrets, foster companies’ 
competitiveness whereas the use of formal protection mechanisms, in particular, 
patents, trademarks and geographical indications, negatively impacts that same 
competitiveness. Such results seem at odds with extant literature that highlight the 
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importance of formal IPRs protection mechanisms, especially in small businesses 
(Chaudhuri, Goldberg and Jia, 2003; WIPO, 2006), and its extensive use throughout the 
industrial history to obtain competitive advantage (Singh, 2015). Thus, in line with Sey 
et al. (2010), the most competitive Academic Spin-offs inquired tend to use informal 
instead of formal IPRs protection mechanisms. Summing up, the type of IPRs strategy 
influences companies’ competitiveness.  
We further uncovered that the impact on companies’ competitiveness of informal 
protection mechanisms is higher the smaller is the company’s size. This finding 
confirms what other authors (e.g., Thomä and Bizer, 2013) had already mentioned: the 
use of informal protection mechanisms by small companies is more profitable in terms 
of the appropriation of innovations returns. In contrast, the impact of formal protection 
mechanisms on companies’ competitiveness is stronger the larger is the company. 
Similarly, and in line with Thomä and Bizer’s (2013) contribution, the higher the R&D 
commitment to achieve the returns of innovation, the stronger is the impact of formal 
protection mechanisms on ASOs’ competitivess. Hence, the use of formal protection 
mechanisms seems to be an added value to the highly R&D intensive companies. In a 
divergent fashion, results suggested the impact of informal protection mechanisms is 
higher for the least R&D intensive companies. This latter evidence seems to go in line 
with studies (e.g., Baldwin and Gellatly, 2003; Mazzarol and Reboud, 2009) that show 
that small companies are less R&D intensive and, therefore, opt by more informal 
protection mechanisms.  
5.2. Limitations and avenues for future research 
This research study has some limitations that may constitute avenues for further and 
future research. The most obvious is related with the reduced number of responses and 
the focus on a unique type of companies, the ASOs. Although the sample is 
representative of the population, it would be illuminating to include in the analysis not 
only ASOs but other type of startups companies.  
Additionally, the competitiveness was assessed over a very small period of time (three 
years). The consideration of a longitudinal analysis, involving a longer period of time, 
and resorting to panel data techniques would certainly enrich the analysis.  
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A2 – Email letter to target companies 
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Table A 1: Determinants of companies’ competitiveness (dependent variable: top 25% more competitive companies according to average sales per capita)  
    
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
IP
R
 u
se
 
Informal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Trade secret (dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-0,853 0,260 1,492 0,401 0,995 0,445 -1,030 0,201 
0,461 0,662 7,271 0,051 2,178 0,189 0,415 0,709 0,683 0,541 3,345 0,220 1,819 0,230 0,965 0,450 
Lead time (dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-0,952 0,437 15,393 0,040 1,131 0,554 -0,675 0,614                 
Complementary assets  (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
                -1,568 0,259 0,740 0,795 -0,305 0,862 -2,464 0,166 
Formal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Patents (dummy=1 if the firm uses this IPR; 
0 otherwise) 
-0,558 0,588 -1,038 0,682 -0,835 0,496 1,154 0,545 
-1,141 0,444 -14,794 0,088 -1,142 0,513 -2,305 0,312 -1,075 0,476 -3,697 0,224 -0,796 0,627 -1,515 0,533 
Trademarks (dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-1,934 0,098 -5,810 0,078 -1,379 0,292 -3,103 0,095 -1,882 0,122 -3,907 0,108 -1,543 0,229 -2,913 0,155 
Industrial design (dummy=1 if the firm uses 
this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-20,468 0,999 #### 0,995 #### 0,999 -24,484 0,998 -20,604 0,999 -31,303 0,997 #### 0,999 -25,428 0,998 
Geographical indications (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
0,270 0,811 -11,249 0,021 -0,014 0,992 -1,662 0,339 0,631 0,606 -3,012 0,224 0,294 0,838 -0,930 0,623 
Copyrights and rights related to copyright 
(dummy=1 if the firm uses this IPR; 0 
otherwise) 
1,244 0,314 -12,932 0,060 0,545 0,694 0,207 0,916 1,137 0,367 -2,183 0,432 0,748 0,580 0,235 0,915 
  
Interaction 
between IPRs 
type and 
Size/type of 
innovation 
Informal*size     -2,190 0,216 -1,261 0,304         -12,440 0,052 -1,651 0,295         -3,271 0,315 -0,908 0,494     
Informal*ID     -2,519 0,537 -3,862 0,246         -13,705 0,211 -4,569 0,397         -2,583 0,656 -3,774 0,449     
Formal*size     3,272 0,264     0,776 0,686     34,070 0,031     6,106 0,117     13,833 0,155     6,633 0,147 
Formal*ID     -14,483 0,050     
-
14,014 
0,031     -28,103 0,105     -9,758 0,194     -10,091 0,310     -12,512 0,126 
C
o
n
tr
o
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s Companies' 
characteristics 
Age (ln) 1,489 0,123 1,742 0,148 1,827 0,083 1,301 0,220 2,381 0,095 -0,042 0,988 2,924 0,076 1,935 0,269 2,776 0,078 1,365 0,534 2,951 0,073 2,515 0,191 
Size (ln) 0,292 0,553 0,858 0,431 0,948 0,290 0,588 0,513 0,785 0,240 -2,870 0,432 1,784 0,166 -0,926 0,572 0,946 0,128 -2,455 0,357 1,211 0,207 -0,952 0,614 
Human capital (dummy=1 if the firm 
employs at least one PhD; 0 otherwise) 
-0,203 0,849 -0,546 0,704 -0,254 0,828 -0,013 0,991 -1,132 0,418 -3,281 0,248 -1,476 0,333 -1,207 0,410 -1,134 0,419 -1,956 0,324 -1,379 0,358 -1,420 0,351 
R&D intensity (dummy=1 if the firm has a 
R&D intensity above 50%) 
-1,146 0,291 3,240 0,264 1,381 0,552 2,651 0,197 -0,406 0,753 -1,169 0,884 2,547 0,522 0,856 0,759 -0,713 0,577 0,940 0,819 2,091 0,575 1,432 0,641 
Context 
Sector (dummy=1 if the companies 
operates in Computing sector; 0 otherwise) 
-1,466 0,191 -1,255 0,304 -0,965 0,405 -1,461 0,199 -2,286 0,115 -4,025 0,115 -2,036 0,202 -2,841 0,047 -2,328 0,111 -3,030 0,123 -1,979 0,204 -3,102 0,043 
Region (dummy=1 if the firm is located in 
UPTEC; 0 otherwise) 
0,624 0,485 0,716 0,567 0,525 0,579 0,235 0,825 1,006 0,301 2,759 0,185 0,621 0,537 1,195 0,291 0,970 0,317 0,760 0,520 0,652 0,515 0,835 0,464 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Top competitiveness companies 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Other 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Godness of fit 
Adjusted R2 0,288 0,51 0,387 0,447 0,456 0,790 0,514 0,554 0,471 0,645 0,507 0,599 
Hosmer and Lameshow Test (p-value) 5,983 0,649 7,285 0,506 7,216 0,515 11,407 0,180 5,154 0,741 33,851 0,000 4,314 0,828 6,542 0,587 7,130 0,523 3,058 0,931 2,375 0,967 3,569 0,894 
% correct 83,3 81,3 79,2 75,0 77,1 97,9 81,3 85,4 79,2 85,4 81,3 83,3 
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Table A 2: Determinants of companies’ competitiveness (dependent variable: top 50% more competitive companies according average sales per capita) 
    
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D 
beta 
p-
value 
beta p-value beta 
p-
value 
beta p-value beta p-value beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta p-value beta 
p-
value 
beta p-value 
IP
R
 u
se
 
Informal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Trade secret (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-0,568 0,503 -1,183 0,580 
-
0,446 
0,809 -0,560 0,517 
-3,140 0,100 2,087 0,674 -2,469 0,224 -2,194 0,281 -1,948 0,142 
-
1,457 
0,572 -2,548 0,206 
-
0,913 
0,568 
Lead time (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
3,046 0,214 17,991 0,378 2,812 0,424 2,366 0,334                 
Complementary assets  
(dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
                1,331 0,488 0,185 0,954 -0,448 0,867 
-
0,271 
0,916 
Formal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Patents (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-2,801 0,111 -2,674 0,418 
-
4,438 
0,054 -1,029 0,715 
-5,478 0,046 -26,469 0,344 -5,176 0,067 -7,084 0,039 -3,961 0,037 -5,829 0,070 -4,152 0,053 -6,129 0,041 
Trademarks (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-2,118 0,302 -10,024 0,287 -2,120 0,366 -4,217 0,224 -1,699 0,388 -3,460 0,273 -2,004 0,396 -3,795 0,224 
Industrial design (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-19,133 0,999 -40,849 0,996 -20,214 0,998 
-
23,366 
0,998 
-
20,077 
0,999 
-
24,195 
0,998 -21,223 0,998 
-
26,114 
0,998 
Geographical indications 
(dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-1,256 0,440 -20,059 0,391 -2,233 0,271 -3,083 0,265 -0,889 0,560 -3,486 0,288 -1,863 0,346 -3,131 0,260 
Copyrights and rights related to 
copyright (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-1,015 0,479 -15,398 0,345 -1,257 0,468 -2,957 0,260 -0,386 0,785 -2,726 0,446 -0,714 0,640 -3,603 0,272 
  
Interaction 
between IPRs 
type and 
Size/type of 
innovation 
Informal*size     2,218 0,269 1,462 0,366         -6,868 0,461 0,725 0,754         1,730 0,435 2,304 0,244     
Informal*ID     -8,047 0,198 
-
7,354 
0,087         -37,230 0,337 -6,361 0,296         
-
10,223 
0,269 -6,416 0,302     
Formal*size     -2,102 0,425     -0,224 0,918     24,593 0,400     6,226 0,369     3,429 0,693     8,434 0,290 
Formal*ID     0,021 0,998     -6,970 0,210     43,519 0,361     -2,431 0,782     7,920 0,538     -3,846 0,689 
C
o
n
tr
o
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s Companies' 
characteristics 
Age (ln) 2,236 0,040 2,836 0,044 2,716 0,033 2,158 0,051 1,757 0,219 2,048 0,533 2,410 0,163 1,454 0,380 2,016 0,145 2,656 0,207 2,496 0,146 1,737 0,285 
Size (ln) -0,135 0,812 -0,611 0,658 
-
1,106 
0,347 0,153 0,899 0,222 0,758 -5,232 0,379 -0,197 0,913 -2,497 0,420 -0,053 0,941 -2,846 0,381 -1,470 0,286 -3,740 0,283 
Human capital (dummy=1 if the 
firm employs at least one PhD; 0 
otherwise) 
-0,236 0,838 -0,211 0,867 
-
0,482 
0,688 -0,167 0,880 1,887 0,419 3,408 0,502 1,493 0,516 1,083 0,661 0,654 0,705 0,030 0,991 0,679 0,721 -0,307 0,881 
R&D intensity (dummy=1 if the 
firm has a R&D intensity above 
50%) 
-2,151 0,069 2,590 0,381 1,880 0,466 0,367 0,859 -2,998 0,151 -1,480 0,806 1,001 0,813 -2,758 0,394 -1,715 0,293 1,312 0,777 1,575 0,708 -1,512 0,610 
Context 
Sector (dummy=1 if the 
companies operates in 
Computing sector; 0 otherwise) 
-3,007 0,023 -2,540 0,033 
-
2,602 
0,028 -2,696 0,027 -4,003 0,024 -10,192 0,318 -4,162 0,036 -4,728 0,024 -3,653 0,023 -4,296 0,043 -4,269 0,029 -4,549 0,022 
Region (dummy=1 if the firm is 
located in UPTEC; 0 otherwise) 
0,825 0,424 0,802 0,499 0,938 0,416 0,501 0,661 2,247 0,243 0,163 0,966 2,095 0,320 2,634 0,224 1,575 0,333 1,518 0,479 2,037 0,309 1,905 0,300 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Top competitiveness companies 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Other 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Godness of fit 
Adjusted R2 0,610 0,680 0,667 0,643 0,770 0,822 0,784 0,781 0,753 0,788 0,776 0,769 
Hosmer and Lameshow Test (p-
value) 
10,293 0,245 7,535 0,480 5,104 0,746 5,048 0,752 4,139 0,844 6,572 0,583 2,346 0,969 8,336 0,401 4,164 0,842 5,256 0,730 1,079 0,998 4,826 0,776 
% correct 85,4 87,5 87,5 87,5 87,5 85,4 85,4 89,6 91,7 89,6 89,6 89,6 
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Table A 3: Determinants of companies’ competitiveness (dependent variable: top 25% more competitive companies according average GVA per capita) 
    
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta p-value beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta p-value beta p-value 
IP
R
 u
se
 
Informal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Trade secret (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-2,168 0,023 -0,078 0,968 -0,296 0,830 -2,309 0,020 
-0,927 0,501 2,343 0,463 -0,150 0,934 -2,208 0,256 -0,382 0,748 1,157 0,472 0,265 0,873 -0,793 0,541 
Lead time (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-3,927 0,044 -1,618 0,652 -1,496 0,543 -5,364 0,043                 
Complementary assets  
(dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
                -3,143 0,051 2,025 0,357 -1,222 0,534 -4,198 0,040 
Formal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Patents (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
2,220 0,148 0,668 0,807 2,726 0,113 2,612 0,176 
2,646 0,106 -3,881 0,523 3,317 0,087 2,296 0,392 1,882 0,144 -4,170 0,110 3,133 0,091 1,537 0,491 
Trademarks (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-1,168 0,360 -3,389 0,191 -1,179 0,469 -2,892 0,149 -0,463 0,694 -2,298 0,152 -0,906 0,573 -1,253 0,391 
Industrial design (dummy=1 if 
the firm uses this IPR; 0 
otherwise) 
-0,655 0,741 -8,897 0,976 0,142 0,956 -1,627 0,548 -0,451 0,805 -4,370 0,512 0,186 0,940 -0,868 0,731 
Geographical indications 
(dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
2,252 0,179 -1,699 0,788 3,753 0,110 4,163 0,159 1,683 0,207 -1,470 0,483 3,668 0,106 3,430 0,136 
Copyrights and rights related to 
copyright (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
1,651 0,336 4,106 0,394 0,702 0,725 3,872 0,176 0,743 0,623 -0,926 0,589 0,387 0,827 2,528 0,245 
  
Interaction 
between IPRs 
type and 
Size/type of 
innovation 
Informal*size     -2,128 0,430 -2,135 0,082         -1,340 0,699 -2,815 0,124         -2,592 0,265 -3,032 0,074     
Informal*ID     -33,477 0,086 -0,625 0,842         -64,445 0,291 -0,237 0,960         -25,960 0,150 -0,109 0,982     
Formal*size     1,211 0,745     -1,159 0,480     3,707 0,518     -2,053 0,418     4,925 0,154     -2,377 0,322 
Formal*ID     48,278 0,052     4,237 0,309     101,800 0,216     14,423 0,130     49,785 0,038     11,170 0,164 
C
o
n
tr
o
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s Companies' 
characteristics 
Age (ln) 0,787 0,420 2,325 0,176 1,051 0,307 1,089 0,288 2,299 0,107 3,435 0,286 3,509 0,074 4,356 0,091 1,988 0,118     3,541 0,070 3,604 0,077 
Size (ln) 0,164 0,758 0,060 0,963 1,414 0,114 0,715 0,450 -0,324 0,645 -0,318 0,874 1,204 0,332 0,601 0,648 0,292 0,657 -0,942 0,471 1,618 0,113 1,654 0,244 
Human capital (dummy=1 if the 
firm employs at least one PhD; 
0 otherwise) 
0,362 0,748 1,820 0,425 0,530 0,669 0,540 0,648 0,075 0,960 1,073 0,748 0,889 0,652 1,207 0,548 -0,387 0,768 1,019 0,630 0,623 0,745 0,044 0,977 
R&D intensity (dummy=1 if the 
firm has a R&D intensity above 
50%) 
-1,186 0,306 -10,645 0,143 -0,745 0,766 -3,300 0,214 -0,021 0,989 -21,609 0,942 -0,161 0,957 -6,911 0,190 -0,909 0,534 -14,850 0,116 -0,577 0,852 -6,409 0,161 
Context 
Sector (dummy=1 if the 
companies operates in 
Computing sector; 0 otherwise) 
-0,495 0,639 0,806 0,640 -0,175 0,882 -0,509 0,658 -0,005 0,997 -2,995 0,539 1,269 0,503 -0,271 0,900 -0,446 0,739 -1,122 0,532 1,099 0,569 -0,781 0,666 
Region (dummy=1 if the firm is 
located in UPTEC; 0 otherwise) 
-1,304 0,207 -2,773 0,083 -1,814 0,117 -1,308 0,220 -1,134 0,265 -4,123 0,219 -1,358 0,234 -0,965 0,359 -1,110 0,268     -1,380 0,225 -0,917 0,367 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Top competitiveness companies 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Other 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Godness of fit 
Adjusted R2 0,301 0,612 0,401 0,341 0,374 0,676 0,462 0,465 0,331 0,567 0,463 0,418 
Hosmer and Lameshow Test (p-
value) 
12,203 0,142 4,729 0,786 3,573 0,893 4,441 0,815 5,324 0,722 3,758 0,878 6,009 0,646 1,590 0,991 1,875 0,985 7,925 0,436 6,396 0,603 2,119 0,977 
% correct 75,0 85,4 79,2 81,3 75,0 87,5 79,2 83,3 79,2 85,4 75,0 79,2 
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Table A 4: Determinants of companies’ competitiveness (dependent variable: top 50% more competitive companies according average GVA per capita)  
    
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta p-value beta p-value beta p-value 
IP
R
 u
se
 
Informal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Trade secret (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-1,244 0,115 -2,385 0,151 -1,229 0,368 -1,306 0,108 
-0,842 0,354 -1,478 0,335 -0,810 0,486 -1,191 0,241 -0,913 0,307 -1,180 0,417 -0,700 0,534 -1,270 0,203 
Lead time (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-1,082 0,333 -1,715 0,475 -1,468 0,448 -0,927 0,449                 
Complementary assets  (dummy=1 
if the firm uses this IPR; 0 
otherwise) 
    -0,447 0,830         -1,259 0,347 -1,029 0,573 -1,159 0,497 -0,997 0,489 
Formal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Patents (dummy=1 if the firm uses 
this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
0,448 0,663 0,330 0,899 0,397 0,709 0,804 0,670 
-0,042 0,965 -1,417 0,425 0,167 0,871 -1,436 0,336 -0,071 0,941 -1,660 0,338 0,103 0,919 -1,394 0,348 
Trademarks (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-0,359 0,693 -1,343 0,363 -0,393 0,691 -1,219 0,330 -0,160 0,867 -1,214 0,403 -0,116 0,906 -1,036 0,416 
Industrial design (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
1,004 0,438 -1,143 0,608 1,017 0,446 -0,562 0,768 1,099 0,397 -1,106 0,622 1,192 0,369 -0,411 0,827 
Geographical indications 
(dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-0,023 0,979 -0,647 0,665 -0,356 0,724 -0,125 0,918 0,101 0,912 -0,726 0,620 -0,166 0,873 0,024 0,985 
Copyrights and rights related to 
copyright (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-0,165 0,866 -0,858 0,661 -0,292 0,795 -0,632 0,653 -0,481 0,630 -1,399 0,420 -0,675 0,527 -0,827 0,559 
  
Interaction 
between IPRs 
type and 
Size/type of 
innovation 
Informal*size     2,978 0,093 0,098 0,924         2,707 0,172 0,605 0,649         1,935 0,245 0,223 0,825     
Informal*ID     -11,198 0,069 -0,505 0,817         -10,438 0,072 -1,797 0,570         -10,351 0,082 -1,770 0,575     
Formal*size     -3,671 0,112     -1,138 0,464     -1,683 0,576     0,242 0,908     -1,293 0,662     0,106 0,959 
Formal*ID     16,298 0,052     3,490 0,248     19,484 0,044     7,703 0,109     19,184 0,046     7,622 0,113 
C
o
n
tr
o
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Companies' 
characteristic
s 
Age (ln) 1,012 0,223 1,706 0,107 1,012 0,224 1,194 0,165 1,065 0,247 1,733 0,136 1,080 0,245 1,321 0,186 1,079 0,245 1,698 0,140 1,105 0,237 1,351 0,181 
Size (ln) -0,086 0,848 -0,488 0,663 -0,157 0,854 0,390 0,657 -0,183 0,709 -1,411 0,352 -0,658 0,560 -0,440 0,723 -0,138 0,769 -0,967 0,458 -0,322 0,697 -0,314 0,786 
Human capital (dummy=1 if the 
firm employs at least one PhD; 0 
otherwise) 
-0,582 0,500 -0,868 0,417 -0,621 0,480 -0,407 0,655 -0,458 0,634 -0,878 0,489 -0,702 0,497 -0,277 0,806 -0,430 0,656 -0,846 0,506 -0,640 0,538 -0,236 0,834 
R&D intensity (dummy=1 if the 
firm has a R&D intensity above 
50%) 
-1,070 0,195 -1,756 0,383 -0,773 0,614 -2,433 0,130 -1,082 0,270 -2,902 0,304 0,002 0,999 -3,818 0,069 -1,266 0,201 -3,021 0,279 -0,284 0,887 -3,940 0,061 
Context 
Sector (dummy=1 if the 
companies operates in Computing 
sector; 0 otherwise) 
0,296 0,738 0,966 0,349 0,318 0,725 0,406 0,669 0,412 0,674 0,839 0,443 0,420 0,678 0,466 0,659 0,471 0,636 0,916 0,396 0,539 0,592 0,524 0,622 
Region (dummy=1 if the firm is 
located in UPTEC; 0 otherwise) 
-0,729 0,330 -0,565 0,515 -0,736 0,337 -0,645 0,434 -0,688 0,389 -0,708 0,437 -0,816 0,331 -0,347 0,684 -0,695 0,389 -0,693 0,445 -0,820 0,330 -0,338 0,693 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Top competitiveness companies 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Other 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Godness of fit 
Adjusted R2 0,292 0,442 0,293 0,334 0,309 0,458 0,318 0,37 0,308 0,448 0,315 0,369 
Hosmer and Lameshow Test (p-
value) 
13,756 0,088 11,377 0,187 14,174 0,077 7,530 0,481 5,548 0,698 4,950 0,763 7,818 0,451 12,485 0,131 8,210 0,413 6,690 0,570 14,498 0,070 19,132 0,014 
% correct 70,8 72,9 72,9 72,9 70,8 72,9 70,8 70,8 79,2 77,1 79,2 72,9 
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Table A 5: Determinants of companies’ competitiveness (dependent variable: top 25% more competitive companies according average EBITDA) 
    
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta p-value beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta p-value beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
IP
R
 u
se
 
Informal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Trade secret (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-0,767 0,330 -1,318 0,384 -0,630 0,628 -0,775 0,320 
-0,071 0,943 4,734 0,074 0,757 0,572 -0,422 0,691 0,109 0,914 0,709 0,605 0,356 0,778 -0,294 0,783 
Lead time (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
0,048 0,968 12,524 0,024 1,510 0,467 0,100 0,932                 
Complementary assets  
(dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
                -0,718 0,592 0,568 0,778 -0,407 0,811 -0,642 0,652 
Formal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Patents (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
0,150 0,900 1,161 0,573 0,052 0,966 0,990 0,595 
-1,375 0,333 -21,313 0,019 -1,339 0,385 -3,871 0,154 -1,266 0,376 -5,686 0,113 -1,160 0,434 -3,863 0,173 
Trademarks (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-1,161 0,272 -7,019 0,029 -0,903 0,418 -2,268 0,114 -0,955 0,386 -2,701 0,111 -0,885 0,430 -2,063 0,168 
Industrial design (dummy=1 if 
the firm uses this IPR; 0 
otherwise) 
-0,004 0,998 -14,893 0,034 0,300 0,847 -2,269 0,332 0,042 0,978 -4,280 0,177 0,118 0,938 -2,240 0,350 
Geographical indications 
(dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
0,306 0,768 -0,859 0,638 0,415 0,721 -0,056 0,968 0,589 0,605 -0,199 0,906 0,523 0,674 0,294 0,850 
Copyrights and rights related to 
copyright (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-0,109 0,921 -12,698 0,019 -0,593 0,639 -1,065 0,483 -0,168 0,882 -2,285 0,232 -0,266 0,822 -1,102 0,488 
  
Interaction 
between IPRs 
type and 
Size/type of 
innovation 
Informal*size     1,256 0,404 0,186 0,866         -9,479 0,029 -1,154 0,449         -0,450 0,777 -0,203 0,861     
Informal*ID     -4,237 0,386 -1,478 0,603         -12,493 0,116 -1,000 0,783         -6,412 0,291 -0,669 0,855     
Formal*size     -1,976 0,335     -0,904 0,566     15,829 0,021     1,604 0,492     2,975 0,310     1,554 0,513 
Formal*ID     4,410 0,513     -0,116 0,975     63,808 0,036     9,318 0,240     21,869 0,133     9,846 0,246 
C
o
n
tr
o
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s Companies' 
characteristics 
Age (ln) 0,898 0,361 0,955 0,353 0,852 0,393 0,945 0,353 0,892 0,434 -0,920 0,591 1,088 0,366 0,722 0,551 1,051 0,375 0,787 0,522 1,068 0,371 0,861 0,491 
Size (ln) 0,878 0,100 1,007 0,283 0,775 0,352 1,288 0,144 1,119 0,072 2,392 0,154 1,923 0,134 0,464 0,688 1,094 0,062 0,207 0,869 1,175 0,174 0,484 0,681 
Human capital (dummy=1 if the 
firm employs at least one PhD; 
0 otherwise) 
-0,753 0,495 -0,886 0,458 -0,860 0,442 -0,662 0,552 -1,054 0,375 -3,507 0,071 -1,126 0,361 -1,327 0,314 -1,044 0,380 -1,969 0,192 -1,083 0,376 -1,304 0,322 
R&D intensity (dummy=1 if the 
firm has a R&D intensity above 
50%) 
-0,864 0,424 -0,291 0,889 -0,091 0,960 -0,662 0,727 -0,853 0,466 -24,027 0,031 -0,457 0,842 -4,529 0,202 -0,981 0,423 -6,819 0,180 -0,570 0,811 -4,951 0,208 
Context 
Sector (dummy=1 if the 
companies operates in 
Computing sector; 0 otherwise) 
-0,742 0,459 -0,420 0,693 -0,640 0,530 -0,636 0,538 -0,955 0,406 -0,404 0,795 -0,670 0,582 -1,270 0,315 -0,930 0,417 -0,971 0,452 -0,829 0,485 -1,242 0,326 
Region (dummy=1 if the firm is 
located in UPTEC; 0 otherwise) 
-0,943 0,305 -1,104 0,261 -0,967 0,306 -1,072 0,263 -0,375 0,679 -0,335 0,821 -0,675 0,508 0,149 0,886 -0,464 0,611 -0,317 0,783 -0,577 0,560 0,083 0,937 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Top competitiveness companies 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Other 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Godness of fit 
Adjusted R2 0,231 0,268 0,239 0,241 0,276 0,559 0,299 0,329 0,283 0,385 0,286 0,334 
Hosmer and Lameshow Test (p-
value) 
6,038 0,643 2,671 0,953 5,975 0,650 7,952 0,438 11,205 0,190 2,789 0,947 10,131 0,256 1,385 0,994 9,728 0,285 1,525 0,992 9,976 0,267 1,368 0,995 
% correct 79,2 75 75 77,1 72,9 85,4 75,0 79,2 75,0 83,3 75,0 79,2 
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Table A 6: Determinants of companies’ competitiveness (dependent variable: top 50% more competitive companies according average EBITDA) 
    
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D 
beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta p-value beta 
p-
value 
beta 
p-
value 
beta p-value beta 
p-
value 
beta p-value beta p-value beta p-value beta p-value beta 
p-
value 
IP
R
 u
se
 
Informal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Trade secret (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-0,350 0,635 -0,549 0,697 -0,586 0,650 
-
0,360 
0,625 
-1,748 0,090 -5,446 0,053 -2,793 0,045 -2,978 0,051 -1,682 0,092 -5,788 0,056 
-
2,818 
0,045 -2,861 0,054 
Lead time (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
1,072 0,376 0,239 0,908 0,411 0,825 2,061 0,161                 
Complementary assets  
(dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
                1,230 0,358 1,403 0,442 0,794 0,642 2,390 0,148 
Formal IPRs 
(average 
importance of 
the IPR in ln) 
Patents (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-1,138 0,246 -1,614 0,384 -1,148 0,263 
-
1,509 
0,350 
-1,499 0,190 -2,729 0,141 -2,151 0,102 -3,062 0,083 -1,434 0,188 -3,281 0,099 -2,220 0,094 -3,199 0,074 
Trademarks (dummy=1 if the 
firm uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-1,499 0,153 -3,790 0,053 -2,079 0,110 -2,860 0,053 -1,681 0,138 -4,514 0,055 -2,282 0,107 -3,288 0,044 
Industrial design (dummy=1 if 
the firm uses this IPR; 0 
otherwise) 
0,885 0,528 2,884 0,343 0,941 0,526 1,004 0,659 0,841 0,548 3,111 0,333 0,971 0,504 0,719 0,744 
Geographical indications 
(dummy=1 if the firm uses this 
IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-0,025 0,978 1,456 0,402 0,408 0,696 0,425 0,750 -0,173 0,857 1,277 0,481 0,279 0,795 0,032 0,981 
Copyrights and rights related to 
copyright (dummy=1 if the firm 
uses this IPR; 0 otherwise) 
-0,444 0,656 1,159 0,548 0,133 0,910 -0,690 0,588 -0,115 0,911 1,412 0,429 0,309 0,775 -0,084 0,952 
  
Interaction 
between IPRs 
type and 
Size/type of 
innovation 
Informal*size     0,378 0,764 0,196 0,848         2,517 0,259 0,129 0,923         2,435 0,214 0,060 0,958     
Informal*ID     -0,889 0,776 0,117 0,959         0,928 0,786 4,251 0,152         0,426 0,904 4,312 0,152     
Formal*size     -0,151 0,918     0,095 0,938     -4,565 0,250     -1,171 0,605     -4,796 0,234     -0,895 0,682 
Formal*ID     1,925 0,625     1,177 0,685     9,497 0,130     8,675 0,071     11,298 0,112     9,041 0,068 
C
o
n
tr
o
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s Companies' 
characteristics 
Age (ln) 0,395 0,610 0,494 0,544 0,381 0,624 0,453 0,566 0,328 0,717 1,296 0,323 0,327 0,731 0,754 0,491 0,353 0,693 1,250 0,343 0,320 0,736 0,701 0,525 
Size (ln) 0,301 0,506 0,041 0,966 0,160 0,855 0,218 0,781 0,332 0,515 0,629 0,616 0,255 0,808 0,740 0,533 0,268 0,585 0,767 0,524 0,292 0,734 0,480 0,676 
Human capital (dummy=1 if the 
firm employs at least one PhD; 
0 otherwise) 
-0,238 0,778 -0,255 0,770 -0,233 0,783 
-
0,265 
0,760 0,999 0,372 3,583 0,132 1,545 0,245 2,259 0,195 0,935 0,394 4,003 0,134 1,578 0,234 2,131 0,210 
R&D intensity (dummy=1 if the 
firm has a R&D intensity above 
50%) 
-0,866 0,297 -1,069 0,533 -0,961 0,553 
-
1,348 
0,347 -1,258 0,254 -5,461 0,066 -3,668 0,077 -4,717 0,052 -1,060 0,319 -5,977 0,068 -3,617 0,080 -4,562 0,059 
Context 
Sector (dummy=1 if the 
companies operates in 
Computing sector; 0 otherwise) 
-1,583 0,091 -1,571 0,106 -1,613 0,095 
-
1,620 
0,091 -1,118 0,272 -0,883 0,496 -1,378 0,220 -0,905 0,449 -1,158 0,257 -0,974 0,460 -1,430 0,204 -1,027 0,391 
Region (dummy=1 if the firm is 
located in UPTEC; 0 otherwise) 
1,083 0,161 1,212 0,135 1,114 0,156 1,174 0,145 1,424 0,130 3,132 0,046 1,951 0,076 2,308 0,055 1,404 0,129 3,495 0,050 2,008 0,073 2,323 0,054 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Top competitiveness companies 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Other 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Godness of fit 
Adjusted R2 0,256 0,262 0,257 0,26 0,356 0,468 0,404 0,434 0,357 0,478 0,407 0,437 
Hosmer and Lameshow Test (p-
value) 
15,390 0,052 10,554 0,228 12,000 0,151 9,021 0,341 5,355 0,719 8,859 0,354 10,576 0,227 7,283 0,506 5,729 0,678 10,694 0,220 6,293 0,614 11,357 0,182 
% correct 60,4 58,3 60,4 62,5 70,8 75,0 70,8 72,9 70,8 72,9 66,7 66,7 
 
